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The research problem is to examine Goethe's educational philos­
ophy as identified through an analytical study of the character Werther 
in Goethe's novel The Sufferings of Young Werther.
The purpose of this study is to reveal the epistemological 
premises of the learning construct that are within the context of the 
novel, and to derive from these premises specific learning principles 
that* can be applied to educational theory. Goethe's concepts of the 
human will, the self, responsibility, choice, and growth are defined 
and subsequently utilised as the skeletal frame from which to con­
struct the working principles of his thought process. By focusing on 
Goethe's actual thinking and how he comes to know, the novel becomes 
a means, or mode, with which to illustrate the epistemological func­
tioning of his mind.
Within this short novel, the inherent potentiality for learn­
ing theory is substantial. Goethe was offering his reading public a 
learning construct by means of the relationship he established with 
himself and his literary creation. The. nature of the relationship was 
such that both he and his readers would be provided with a learning 
methodology. To determine the premises of the learning construct from 
the medium of the novel and then to apply these premises to the formula­
tion of specific learning principles becomes the means by which to iso­
late the educational application of Goethe's epistemology.
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Six educational principles have evolved from Goethe's episte­
mological premises as they were examined within the context, of the 
novel. These principles of learning are identified and their signifi­
cance as a totality for learning theory is considered.
1. Goethe realized that the subject matter of education is man, 
and he emphasized the nature of man and his characteristics as a self­
determiner. The focus of education must therefore center upon the 
learner and M s  individuality.
2. Because the self is a unity and functions as a totality, 
learning becomes an experience of each distinct, or unique, self.
Being a composite of the effects of its choices, the self perceives 
learning as an extremely personal matter. This means that education
f  ”’S ” I
must recognize the value that man places on his self in his demand 
for self-cultivation. -
3« Goethe knew that the self can choose to educate itself and 
actually proceed to bring this process about. Through determining the 
validity and reliability of that which it seeks to know, the learner is 
provided with an empirical base from which to begin his instruction.
In this manner, the self becomes its own teacher and the learning act 
is identified as a process of self-examination.
4. It is the self that exerts its own inherent potentiality for 
knowing and learning. Goethe recognized the in, ernal, or intrinsic, 
motivation of the self to seek knowledge and truth, and he demanded that 
the self actively confront its learning object. Education must acknowl­
edge that the „ arner does indeed possess an i ner vitality of his own.
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5. Man is always in relation to that which confronts him as a 
determiner. All learning is creative because the learner is the creator 
of further learning. In his role as creator, the learner cakes a multi­
tude of decisions and must subsequently accept the inherent responsibil­
ity for the choices made and their implications. Goethe vis fully aware 
that in actualizing its choices through application of their meanings, 
the self becomes an active agent in the process of learning.
6. In order to actively participate in the educational process, 
the learner must understand the social nature of man. a relationship of 
mutuality, based on dialogue and intercommunication, is a l a m i n g  
process. This process of learning is the application of knowledge in 




Statement of the Problem
The research problem is to examine Goethe's educational philos­
ophy as identified through an analytical study of the character Werthe’ 
in Goethe's novel The Sufferings of Young Werther.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyze the epistemological 
premises of the learning construct that are within the context of 
Goethe's novel Werther, and to derive from these premises specific 
learning principles that can be applied to educational theory.
Need for the Study
This study is needed in order to understand the educational 
philosophy of Goethe, because neither an intensive nor extensive exam­
ination of his theory of learning has as yet been done. The episte­
mological framework that Goethe constructed for the novel Werther was 
the permanent structure upon which he built his literary corpus. As 
a result, Werther is the prototype for Goethe's theory of knowledge.
Delimitations
The scope of this study will be confined to Goethe's premises 
concerning the human will, the self, responsibility, choice, and
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growth in relationship to the learning process. Implications for a 
humanistic learning theory are subsequently examined.
Limitations
The assumption is made that the reader will be intimately 
acquainted with Goethe’s novei in English translation.
English translations of Goethe's writing appear solely in this 
dissertation unless it is deemed appropriate to include a word or 
phrase in the original German to avoid ambiguity or misunderstanding. 
Publication dates of the original German texts have therefore been 
excluded from the citation of references. Authoritative editions of 
German texts of Werther and the Autobiography were referenced, how­
ever, in order to determine the accuracy and clarity of the English 
translations used in this dissertation.
Work.3 by Goethe that are referenced in this study are limited 
to those primary sources that are cited in the bibliography.
Approach to the Problem
The methodology of this study is as follows: (a) a critical 
examination of the character Werther based upon Goethe's concepts of 
the human will, the self, responsibility, choice, and growth, (b) an 
analysis of Goethe's epistemological premises from the context of the 
novel, (c) the derivation of six principles of learning theory from 
the epistemological premises, and (d) the educational implications 
and applications of the six principles of learning theory.
Rackground of the Problem
Goethe was an epistemologist. Although he is most often por­
trayed and reviewed as a latter eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century German litterateur, he also possessed tremendous potential for 
philosophical theorizing. To elaborate on those concepts that pertain 
to educational theory becomes a pivotal concern in any analysis of 
Goethe’s intellective process. In order to distill only the essential 
ingredients from his thought, certain questions must be posed. What 
made Goethe an epistemologist? What constituted his perspective as an 
epistemologist? What were the inherent principles of his epistemology? 
By seeking a response to such questions as these, the potentiality of 
Goethe as an epistemologist is realized.
Design and Organization of the Study
Goethe's method of learning and his subsequent determination of 
the validity and legitimacy of knowledge is at the core of any examina­
tion of his creativity* It is precisely within the context of his writ-. { fj ■>
ings that Goethe revealed the functioning of his mind. He built a 
thought process based on a continuing and expanding dialogue between 
himself and his literary creations. Every facet of the relationship 
which he constructed and the stance, which he determined was for his 
own sake. Goethe's entire methodology began with this relationship 
to himself; he recognized his own needs and then proceeded to validate 
them. Because he demanded growth in his relationships, Goethe was 
aware that every meaningful relationship was a potential learning 
process.
Through recognition and understanding of his own self, Goethe 
never permitted himself less than total command of any situation that 
confronted him. This ability allowed him to transfer any potentially 
domineering or harmful forces onto a literary self-construct that could
then be manipulated and controlled. In this manner, Goethe made certain 
that the results of his actions were exactly what he willed them to be. 
This was a means for inventing his own future and making sure of the pro­
duct, which was himself. What is actually being presented within his 
poetry and prose is that which can be internalized by the self. Goethe 
identified the self as that embodiment of totality through which the 
individual lives. By selecting any of his major literary productions, 
Goethe's readers are thereby provided with eu access to their own self.
Man is always in relationship to that which confronts him as a 
determiner. As long as he maintains a fully functional mind and recog­
nizes the element of choice, then man is a self-determiner in relation 
to that which is seeking to determine him. Goethe used the self in 
order to define and give meaning to the self. He sought to determine 
the nature of every meaningful relationship betx^een the self and that 
which it confronted. In his quest for meaning and control, Goethe 
acknowledged that the self was the most salient confrontation of all.
Because the self wills a relationship to the self, the individ­
ual establishes a relationship based on criteria validated as a self­
determiner. Goethe structured his epistemology from criteria that 
were truth and he determined the nature of that truth. It is the 
nature of that truth which is going to free the self from all of the 
inroads that rationalization insists upon making. Whereas rationali­
zation employs criteria based on untruth, Goethe demanded that the 
self be confronted with truth and honesty. Honesty is the principle
according to which the individual must evaluate, or validate, a value.
A self-determined mind is a mind that has willed to choose. The
self always has choice and the freedom to exercise that choice as long
as it has control over its relationship with whatever the mind happens 
to confront. Self-determination refers to either the original cause or 
to the effect of that over which the self has control. This is the 
realization by the self-determined mind that it always has confronting 
it the implications of that choice upon which the self must act. In 
either circumstance, the relationship of the self to the question or 
problem of choice and what constitutes freedom remains unchanged.
A value construct is built by the will so that the element of 
choice can convey meaning and purpose. The will determines what is of 
greatest value for the self and this becomes the individual good. Self- 
determination, based on internal determination and will, is necessary to 
validate what has become the good. In order to actualize that which car­
ries a supreme value for the individual, the motivation must be intrin­
sic. The resulting implication of the self's relationship to whatever 
it wills becomes extremely significant.
Self-determination requires a will that is validated in order to 
counter the process of rationalization. This is the action that the 
self has taken in its relationship to the will in order to determine 
the will's legitimacy, meaning, and value. In other words, it is through 
validation that the self actualizes the potentiality of the will. But 
the self can validate rationalization too, because it rationalizes only 
after it has validated. Rationalization is untruth because the self 
has not made use of or listened fully to the cognitive, or empirical, 
factor. Not only must the self validate the value, it must validate 
the criteria used to determine the validity. A fulJy functional mind 
requires the self to use an empirical base that it controls. Then the
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self can enter into a legitimate relationship with itself in order to 
prevent dishonesty. The self has a responsibility to Itself to do 
that which is good, but the problem lies in determining the nature of 
the true good. Validating criteria and the responsibility to be honest 
are the factors with which to solve this dilemma. Goethe demanded that 
the self go through the osmotic process of absorbing the validated good 
and making it a part of the self. This is the heart of the self's rela­
tionship to that which it values.
Intentionality is that which has been declared and validated as 
the good by the self. What are the implications of this statement for 
self-determination? Learning is possible only if a relationship exists, 
and a confrontation is necessary for any relationship. Mutuality is 
the process of dialogue that occurs in the relationship between two dis­
tinct selves. It is the interaction and cross-fertilization between 
that which each self brings to the relationship. Because of the spe­
cificity of certain demands which Goethe placed on every relationship, 
they each acquired a significant potentiality. By making a determina­
tion through the validation process, Goethe knew what his self needed.
In other words, Goethe intended that which he had validated as the 
good. Goethe recognized his own self as it was expressed in his 
intentionality.
Perception influences both the validation process and inten­
tionality. The individual wills to see in a specific way because of 
what he brings to that perception. A responsibility inherent in the 
type of relationship established must be accepted by the self. This 
will in turn carry over and determine the nature of perception. As a
result of this factor, a particular significance is assumed in the dis­
cussion of value Every confrontation implies a decision and inherent 
within that decision is choice. Choice is determined by what carries 
a significant value and the subsequent implications of that value.
Such decisions arise from movement within the human mind that allows 
the self to become transcendent. New relational dimensions and their 
implications are recognized. What the self permits itself to see and 
experience is determined by the honesty of the self. Willing is free 
only when a properly validated choice is based upon the self- 
internalized criteria of honesty and truthfulness.
Inherent within all responsibility is choice. To make a choice 
means acting upon knowledge of the implications of that choice. It is 
the means by which the mind gathers a further sense of knowledge of the 
object with which it is interacting. In essence, the potentiality of 
choice means the potentiality for freedom. Choice becomes a means to 
an end in which is seen the potential to transcend this end. A great 
deal of responsibility is implied in such a process. To begin with, 
the self has a responsibility to determine the meaning and validity of 
responsibility. The self must bring itself to the point of movement 
in which it not only feels obligated but wills to act upon that sense 
of obligation. In other words, the self must actualize and fulfill its 
responsibility. Goethe taught that responsibility is first realized 
within the self. This means that the intellective process of the mine 
must be continually feeding the self so that it can be responsible. It 
also implies that the character of a relationship determines the nature 
of the responsibility. In order to attain an awareness of self­
7
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responsibility, the development; of depth within the totality of con­
sciousness is necessary. Only then will an obligation be realized end 
its potentiality actualized.
Goethe was able to validate the specificity of certain things 
for himself because of his understanding of the human will. The will 
is unique to each self. It is represented by the cognitive, the affec­
tive, and the conative domains of the intellect. Only as a totality 
does the self make a determination; that is, the individual serves 
himself as the embodiment of his will and thereby establishes the 
premise of totality. From within the totality of the self the will 
functions and receives its direction. The source of the will is within 
the self, and it is fed by the intellective process which gives it an 
empirical base from which to act. This empirical base, which is shared 
by each of the three intellective domains, is essential because it is 
always the internal which brings about that which a person wills.
Goethe was certainly aware of the cognitive elements inherent in the 
affective domain. What he required, therefore, was the legitimacy of 
uhat feeling and emotion. Goethe demanded validation by means of his 
own mind. This implied an empiricism, to be sure, but it was an empir­
icism based on the relationship between the cognitive and affective 
spheres of the intellect.
Goethe remained concerned with the ontological quest for the 
totality of beingness. Han realizes that he cannot define his respon­
sibility to someone eJ.se until he has defined it within himself. This 
ontological quest is the process of the self experiencing what it has 
validated for itself as the good. It is recognition of the will and
Che element of determination in the sense of validation. This process 
of evaluation is an integral part of the totality of the self and a 
vital component of that which makes the human mind fully operational.
The human mind must have something upon which to work. Unless 
the a priori (the given) exists, the mind cannot function. Regardless 
of the nature of this given, the mind must continually determine its 
validity or nonvaliiity prior to internalizing the object of confron­
tation. Goethe suggested that the self begins with the given. It is 
the self which has to place some value on, as well as determine the 
validity of, this given. Meaning is derived from validation and to 
understand meaning is to perceive an object in terms of its potential­
ity. The object does not become an end in itself because the individ­
ual sees what it can do for his own self as well as for others.
Goethe experienced the growth and development of a conscious­
ness that is found in the a priori. Man is constantly building an 
evolutionary consciousness which becomes a part of the human relation­
ship. That which Goethe did and did not allow to confront him (his 
historicity) was directly controlled by his relationship to the 
a priori. In this way. Goethe could transcend the limitations that 
man insists on imposing upon himself and that can destroy man’s true 
insight. He thereby remained in control and knew what he had and 
what he needed. This totality of experience brings into being the 
full potential of the given. It is evident that the will experiences 
the a priori, but only when it has first experienced the good and knows 
that it is the good. Man continually builds the nature of the a priori 
by means of the validation process. As a result, the totality of the
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self recognizes that the intention of the a priori is to bring about 
the fulfillment and completion of the validated good.
Above everything else, Goethe recognized that he was a human 
being. As he internalized, Goethe expressed and demanded a basic faith 
in himself. Faith is an expression of the ultimate act of freedom. 
Choice is, therefore, affected by faith because it is dependent on the 
nature of the individual's beingness as a self-determiner. Man has a 
responsibility in self-learning to start with faith and to recognize it 
as such because he cannot be a self-determiner without it. There is no 
freedom if man does not have faith in himself s .d the concurrent deter­
mination to validate this faith. This implies that faith does indeed 
have an empirical base. Goethe insisted that all men must establish a 
relationship to their own selves. What is the nature of that relation­
ship? Is it purposive and honest, or does the self try to fool itself? 
Faith implies both a sense of self-respect and trust in the self.
Goethe realized that knowledge is learned and possessed only in 
terms of the certainty and fulfillment of totality. Consequently, the 
self has to move on one of two premises. Either there is a proven abso­
luteness (certainty) in what is known or else this certainty of knowl­
edge is not possessed and it must be hypothesized. Until the self is 
certain, everything remains open-ended and it brings no closure. In 
the search for the true potentiality of the absolute, the question must 
be posed as to whether the self determines absoluteness through valida­
tion or whether this absoluteness is already determined for the self. 
Knowledge is that which is a part of the self, which the self develops 
and designs, which it internalizes, and which the self comes to
II
recognize in relationship to fact, It must be remembered that the self 
always moves from a given. The potentiality of what comes to be the 
given, the totality, implies .at the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts.
Epistemological cc siderations of Goethe provide insight into 
the factor of transparer . It is the ability to see through the object 
of confrontation based on the empirical evidence obtained. Transparency 
allows the self to make use of externalities for what they are, with 
their potentialities as well as their limitations. Goethe demonstrated 
that it is only through dialogue that an individual can reveal himself; 
that is, make himself transparent. In order for learning to occur, 
another self must be confronted if the individual is to fully know and 
understand his own self. This process of mutuality is established 
between Goethe and his reading public through the medium of his volu­
minous writings. In his short novel, The Sufferings of Young Werther, 
the vitality of the character Werther comes from Goethe himself. It is 
exactly what the author intentionally permits Werther to do or not to 
do that is injected into this literary creation. Knowledge, growth, 
and learning are the end results of such reciprocal interaction between 
Goethe and his audience.
Within the context of the novel Werther, Goethe presented a 
learning construct and its methodology. He placed the same demands 
upon himself that he placed upon the internal development of the novel. 
Goethe positioned this responsibility upon the self, since it makes the 
ultimate determination and choice. The subject matter of education, 
which Goethe validated, is man and his relationship to himself. Testi­
mony to this principle is given by the novel.
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Goethe equated the creative act with the learning act. To stop 
the growth process would be suicide, because man dies when he no longer 
grows. Goethe realized that man, as a self-determiner, is constantly 
involved In the process of designing his future. Learning and living 
are recognition of the need to never stop. Education, therefore, is an 
experiential process. Man has the inherent epistemological responsibil­
ity of determining and giving essence to the inner world of the self so 
that the self wixls to live in order to experience. Werther's failure 
as a man, in contrast to Goethe’s affirmation of life, sustains the 
validity and perpetuity of this premise.
Selection of the Novel
An analysis of the reasons for choosing this particular novel 
of Goethe's will serve to reveal its epistemological significance and 
its potentiality as a learning construct. General comments and obser­
vations will precede an examination of specific clues which Goethe 
intentionally positioned in the opening pages of this work in regard 
to the problem he confronted.
There are two levels from which to approach this novel. It can 
either be read and studied as a piece of literature or received as the 
medium, or vehicle, for transmitting Goethe's epistemological premises. 
If defined as a mode cf conveyance, the reader assumes the responsibil­
ity of extracting from the novel whatever is present in the form of 
epistemological input by Goethe. It must always be remembered that 
Goethe wove his philosophy into the context of his writings rather 
than letting it stand in isolation. His philosophy cai< be understood 
only in terms of relationships, taking into consideration all of the
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subtle implications of the human mind. The context, or nature, of rela­
tionships along with the humanity within which these relationships are 
allowed to grow become an integral part of Goethe's philosophy of living.
Within this short novel, there is substantial potentiality for 
learning theory. Goethe was offering his reading public a learning con­
struct by means of the relationship he established with himself and his 
literary creation. The nature of the relationship was such that both he 
and his -eaders would be provided with a learning methodology. To deter­
mine the premises of the learning construct from the medium of the novel 
and then to apply these premises to the formulation of specific learning 
principles becomes the means by which to isolate the educational applica­
tion of Goethe's epistemology. Questions such as the following can then 
be posed for consideration: What is it that is learned about learning 
theory from this novel? What are the implications for learning theory? 
How is learning theory structured?
By alerting the reader to the true potential for defining Goethe 
as an epistemologist, the novel serves as a means, or mode, by which to 
illustrate how the mind of Goethe worked. Delineating the functions of 
Goethe's mind was a significant factor in choosing this particular work 
for examination.
Goethe attracts his reader with even more strength by suggest­
ing, through references to characters and events in hi Aut ̂ biography, 
a special relationship between The Sufferings of Young Werther and the 
Autobiography. In a brief and succinct statement, it can be said that
this relationship refers to the process of self-examination. On its 
surface, the novel appears to be structured around the self of Werther
14
and his relationship with others. Yet, if approached from a different 
attitude and depth, Goethe can be seen depicting a possibility of action 
which he may well have considered himself. Consequently, it can be 
posited that he wanted to learn what the end result of that action car­
ried to its extreme would be. Werther became a learning process, a sort 
of experiment or test, to see whether or not this was what Goethe wanted 
to do, where he wanted to go, what he wanted to be.
In every facet of the novel, the totality of Goethe's mind is to 
be found. What Goethe thereby implies is that man is the subject matter 
of education. The accent is on man and how he comes to know. What 
Goethe is really talking about is the fully educated man. How must he 
educate himself? What must be made use of? What must be willed in 
order to guarantee this to himself?
For a more specific consideration of Goethe's intended purpose, 
the first page or two of T ‘erCher (depending on the edition) will be 
closely examined. As Goethe (1969) claims in the thirteenth chapter 
of his Autobiography, the novel itself "enlightens and instructs"
(Vol. 2, pp. 219-220). Riggan (1973) correctly identifies Geist (mind, 
spirit), Charakter (character), and Schicksal (fate) as being the "three 
facets" (p. 266) which "form the focus of the story" (p. 262). These 
three words are incorporated into the editor's remarks preceding the 
opening paragraph of the first letter dated Hay 4, 1777 (Goethe 1971, 
p. 2). In his analysis of Goethe, Ortega (1549/1968) develops a body 
of thought which, if applied in this instance, may well clarify Goethe's 
intention with regard to his choice and conspicuous placement of termi­
nology .
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Ortega (1949/1968) offers the following observation:
Life neans the inexorable necessity of realizing the design 
for an existence which each one of us is. This design in 
which the I consists, is not an idea or plan ideated by the 
person involved, and freely chosen. It is anterior to (in 
the sense of independent form) all the ideas which his intel­
lect forms, to all the decisions of his will. Our will is 
free to realize or not to realize this vital design which we 
ultimately are, but it cannot correct it, change it, abbre­
viate it, or substitute anything for it (p. 141).
Continuing in an explanatory manner, Ortega insists:
A mar. possesses a wide margin of freedom with respect to his 
I or destiny. He can refuse to realize it, he can be untrue 
to himself. Then his life lacks authenticity. If "vocation" 
is not taken to mean what it commonly does— merely a generic 
form of professional occupation, of the civil curriculum— but 
to mean an integral and individual program of existence, the 
simplest thing would be to say that our I is our vocation.
Thus we can be true to our vocation to a greater or lesser 
degree, and consequently have a life that is authentic to a 
greater or lesser degree (p. 143).
In other words, it is the individual himself who designs the realization
or nonrealization of his vital design for an existence. This conception
of a vital design is synonymous with destiny, vocation, and the I. It
is an a priori that the self structures, validates, and experiences. To
be authentic, it is a design the self must be true to. Ortega then goes
on to reveal the very problem that Goethe confronted himself with and
wove into the fabric of Werther. He states the following:
It is our life-design, which, in the case of suffering, does 
not coincide with our actual life: the man is torn apart, is 
cut in two— th man who had to be and the man he came to be.
Such a dislocation manifests itself in the form of grief, 
anxiety, ennui, depression, emptiness; coincidence, on the 
contrary, produces the prodigious phenomenon of happiness 
(pp. 152-153).
It is now possible to suggest the correlation of Ortega's "life-design" 
and "authentic I" with Goethe's Geist. In similar fashion, the term
Charakter car. be considered as representing the actual life of the
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individual; that is, the manner in which he designs the realization of 
his Geist. It is a question of what the individual actually wills to 
design, or realize. Ortega approaches this matter by suggesting that 
"man’s life . . .  is having to decide every moment what he must do the 
next moment, and, therefore, having to discover the very plan, the very 
design of his being" (p. 153). This is the realization of the self- 
determining characteristic of the will as manifested by an individual’s 
character. In Goethe's novel Werther, the author depicts the fate 
(Schicksal) of Werther whose Geist and Charakter do not coincide. Yet 
Goethe transcends this surface incongruity by presenting a learning con­
struct and methodology that analyzes the creative relationship between 
Geist and Charakter. The subsequent examination of Goethe’s novel will 
explore the resulting implications of such an epistemology for learning 
theory.
One further reason for having selected Werther as a novel worthy 
of an analytical study must be mentioned. Contained within the very 
first paragraph of the first letter (May 4, 1771) are three pivotal 
concepts which carry epistemological significance (Goethe 1971, p. 3). 
Goethe considers the nature of the human heart, personal relationships, 
and man within just a dozen sentences. The heart represents the affec­
tive, or emotion and feeling. As one of t’ dor- ‘ \e Intellect,
its relationship to the human will is of great importance. Personal 
relationships are a prerequisite for the growth process, and probing 
into the nature of man demands an individual responsibility to know 
one's self. It now becomes even more evident that: Goethe has utilized 
the structure of a short novel to immediately confront both the reader 
and himself with questions of profound epistemological implication.
Definition of Terms
A prlcri. The a priori is the starting point, or given. It is 
what the mine acts on in order to function. This means that the self is 
placing a value on, and the will is determining the validity of, that 
which is given. Because the will is constantly structuring the nature 
of the a priori, the self recognizes that the intention of the a priori 
is to bring about the fulfillment and completion of the validated good.
Affective. The affective is the intellective domain of emotion 
and feeling.,
Awareness. Awareness enables the self to develop, expand, and 
generate a greater depth within the totality of consciousness. It is 
a growing realization of the specificity of the empirical aspects of 
the knowledge possessed.
Choice. Choice is inherent within decision. It is a process 
of selection in which means are selected to satisfy ends in which is 
seen the potential to transcend the end. Choice carries a significant 
value which implies that the self must realize and evaluate the impli­
cations of that value.
Cognitive. The cognitive is the empirical, or rational, domain.
Of f h r 1 "
Conative. The conative is that domain of the intellect identi­
fied by the interaction of the will with the cognitive and the affective 
domains of the intellect.
Consciousness. Consciousness exists the moment the function cf 
the mind begins to operate. It is a totality whose degree of depth is 
determined by the inherent awareness, or knowledge factor, generated
18
within the consciousness. The specificity of these empirical thrusts in 
consciousness is what permits the self to assign a value to perception.
Creativity. Creativity is the development of new potentiality 
between relationships. It is the process of designing the future as a 
self-determiner. Creativity becomes growth as potentiality is actual­
ized .
Dialogue. Dialogue is communication between two distinct selves. 
To dialogue, or to engage in dialogue, is to experience mutuality. It 
is to build and experience a creative relationship. Dialogue reveals 
the self through recognition of the transparency factor.
Empiricism. Empiricism is the means by which the self acquires 
knowledge. The will must act from the cognitivity of ar. empirical base 
in order for it to validate the specificity of the object of confronta­
tion. This implies that empiricism carries within itself the nature of 
the relationship between the cognitive and affective domains of the mind.
Epistemology. Epistemology is concerned with the actual thought 
process. It is the study of how the self comes to know and to determine 
the validity and legitimacy of knowledge. Mind and its function define 
the scope of epistemology.
- .... ..un. i.o evaluate -s to validate a value. It is the
empirical thought process of determining the specificity of that 
object which the mind confronts.
Experience. Experience is the process by which the perceptive 
ability of the conscious mind confronts and interacts with an object.
The nature of the subsequent relationship becomes a willful search for 
meaning in order that the object of value may be made an integral part
19
of the totality of mind. Since the acquisition of knowledge results in 
the modification, or transformation, of its antecedent state, the mind 
becomes aware of the meaning of what the object can come to be (the sig­
nificance of its potentiality).
Fact. Fact is the certainty of knowledge. It is an absolute­
ness which the self has validated. Facts are the means by which the 
self moves toward a totality, because it is only in the fulfillment of 
the certainty of totality that the self can know. It is the nature of 
the relationship between the fact and the whole which establishes its 
value.
Faith. The ultimate act of freedom is faith in the self. Faith 
validates the self's relationship to itself and thereby establishes an 
empirical base. It intrinsically motivates the self and permits the 
mind to function with a willingness as a self-corrector. It determines 
the nature of freedom because it affects the choice made by the self. 
Without faith in himself, man cannot assume the responsibility of self- 
determination.
Freedom. Freedom is the awareness of the decree *r consciou^- 
ne permitted by the mind. It is the transcendent act of freedom that 
allows the mind to function so that it can determine meaning and purpose. 
Freedom enables the mind to realize both limitations and values inherent 
in whatever is confronted.
Good, the. The good is that which carries a supreme value for 
the self as determined by the will. It is the self-realization of mean­
ing and purpose. Self-improvement becomes the good as it is realized in 
the nature of relationships (between the self and the object of confronta­
tion) that are learning constructs.
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Growth. Growth is the process of the self experiencing the 
inherent potentiality of a relationship. Although the self is con­
tinually transformed, it moves only as a totality. This integration 
of experience allows for a cycle of growth that transcends any notion 
of finality.
Historicity. Historicity is the autobiographical signature of 
the self. It is the nature of the self as determined by what it has 
and has not allowed itself to confront.
Intellective Process. The intellective process is the totality 
of the thought process. It is what permits the self to think by making 
use of the wholeness of the relationship between the brain and the 
process of the mind. Unity and interdependence give rise to a total­
ity of consciousness within this mental process.
Intentionality. Intentionality is that which the self has 
declared and validated as the good. It is an intrinsic motivation 
that makes a determination through the ; ’ . ...jn process so that the 
if knows what it needs and proceeds to act from this base.
Knowledge. Knowledge is the meaningfulness experienced by the 
self in the type of relationship established to the object of learning.
The potentiality of knowledge is realized in its relationship to that 
which is the given.
Learning Process. Learning is the realization of new relation­
ships and the subsequent actualization of their potentialities. In order 
to learn, the self must first experience a meaningful relationship with 
whatever the subjeet/object of confrontation is. The process of learning, 
then, is the creative act of sell-examination by means of which the self 
establishes the structure of growth.
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Meaning. Meaning is the significance determined by the self in 
its relationship to an object. As the self acts upon (experiences) the 
object of confrontation, meaning is experiential!? internalized in terms 
of the object's potentiality. The object is not an end in itself because 
the individual sees what it can do for himself and others.
Mind. Mind is the self-generating process of intellective move­
ment toward consciousness. To function as a self-determiner, the mind 
(intellective domains) must be balanced, be conscious of the obMe t that 
it confronts, and continually determine the validitv r» nonvalidity of 
that which it seeks to internalize. It is a will which demands this 
self-corrective motivation o* ' mxad.
Mutuali' Mutuality is the process of dialogue that occurs in 
relationship between two distinct selves. It is the interaction, 
the cross-fertilization, and the reciprocating flew of communication 
between that which each self brings to the relationship. In order for 
learning to take place and for the self to know itself, mutuality is 
essential.
Ontology. Ontology is the metaphysical quest for the totality 
of beingness. It is man looking at himself and defining his responsi­
bility to what he finds within the self.
Perception. Perception is that which brings understanding to 
the self as determined by the will. As such, perception consists of 
the uniqueness and totality of each self with its consciousness. This 
means that the self must accept a responsibility for the nature of the 
relationship established between itself and the object it confronts.
Relationship. A relationship, whether internal or external,
implies confrontation and subsequent growth. This means that the self
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recognizes and utilizes a learning object for what it is, both in terms 
of its potentialities and limitations. Learning is possible only if a 
relationship exists.
Responsibility. Responsibility means that the self must bring 
itself to the point of movement so that it not only feels obligated but 
wills to move or. that sense of obligation. It is the actualization of 
the potentiality of a relationship. The self becomes responsible 
(accountable) to itself through the process of self-determination as 
it is being fed by the intellective process of the mind. Responsibil­
ity is the element of control in the process of choice.
Self. The self is the totality of beingness. It is the embodi­
ment of unique experience that identifies the singularity of each 
organism.
Se 1 f-Detertniner, A self-determiner determines the nature of 
every relationship between the self and that which it confronts. Han 
is a self-determiner to the extent that he establishes a valid rela­
tionship to that which is seeking to determine him. Self-determination 
implies the existence of a fully functional mind and the recognition of 
the element of choice.
Totality. Totality is the holistic manifestation of the singu­
larity of purpose. The unity of purpose transcends the diversity and 
particularity of its structural elements which allows for the realiza­
tion of the full potentiality of that which a totality confronts.
Transcendence. Transcendence of the self is achieved by means 
oi: honesty. It is the ability to rise above the limitations that the 
self may choose to impose upon itself which can destroy insight, mean­
ing, and potentiality. To transcend is for the self to be in control,
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to determine meaning, and to know what it has and what it wants. This 
is a totality of experience that brings into being the full potential 
of the a priori.
Transparency. The factor of transparency is a realization of 
what is true based on the empirical evidence. It is the ability to 
read and see through an object with the knowledge that the self brings 
with it. Transpaxency implies the responsibility of finding meaning in 
relationships. This means that it is only through dialogue that the 
self can be revealed and made transparent. The penetrative nature of 
transparency leads directly to a transcendence which allox̂ s the self 
to determine the meaningfulness of the object's potentiality.
Truth. Truth is the validating and self-corrective process- 
structure of knowledge. The reality of truth is realized by the self 
as it experiences and determines meaning. In the learning process, it 
is the cognitive, or empirical, domain of the intellect that guides the 
search for truth.
Validation. Validation is the process of determining the legit­
imacy and reliability of knowledge. The self acts to realize the correct 
meaning of that with which it is interacting from the potentiality of 
meaning inherent in the object. By means of the nature of the relation­
ship existing between the self and that which it values, criteria are 
established for use in the validation process.
Value. Value is the experience of meaning with its potential 
for self-enhancement. The will determines what is of value for the 
self based on what the self has validated as a need.
Will. The human will originates within the totality of the
self. It functions as it is fed by the intellective process which
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provides the will with direction and an empirical base from which to act. 
Self-determination is predicated on the evaluative and applicative dimen­
sionality of the will. The will structures the value construct through 
validation and then determines the significance of meaning for the self 
and for the seif's relationship to others. The will is the embodiment 
of the unique totality of self as it becomes conscious of purpose through 
realizing the inherent meaning in that which is caused.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The Novel and Its Categories 
of Analysis
Although there exists a multitude of articles, critiques, essays, 
and reviews on the subject of Werther, it is possible to identify four 
distinct approaches to the novel. These four categories are structured 
as follows: (a) psychological and sociological interpretations, (b) 
thematic representations, (c) the identification of specific motifs 
within the novel, and (d) rhp content and structure of the work as an 
example of a particular literary genre. A sample of the diversity of 
material found within each of these major divisions will provide an 
insight into the nature of the research which has and has not been 
conducted with regard to Goethe’s short novel.
Psychological Interpretations
Psychological interpretations frequently include the notion of 
Weltschmerz. Rose. (1924) states that Weltschmerz is "the feeling of 
dissatisfaction, from the unsolved conflict between the ideal and the 
actual" (p. 4). He continues by defining this concept as "the psychic 
state which ensues when there is a sharp contrast between a man's 
ideals and his material environment, and his temperament is such as 
to eliminate the possibility of any sort of reconciliation between the 
two" (p. 5). Rose believes that "Werther is the analysis of a soul
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that cosies to grief through inability to attain harmony with the outer
world” (p. 19). The novel is defined in the following terms:
[It is] a svxabol of the struggle of the human spirit against 
its material restrictions. Its essential significance is 
that it pictures the disintegration of a cultured and sensi­
tive mind which is unable to adjust Itself to the outer world 
when compelled to cope with concrete problems. Goethe has 
given us a psychological novel (Rose 1931, p. 155).
Reiss (1959) suggests that "Werther*s life is determined by the polarity 
between man's limitation [Einschrankung] and his urge for freedom"
(p, 88). Consequently, a condition develops in which "Werther opposes 
to the demands and happenings of the external world the conditions of 
his own inner being" (p. 85). Werther becomes "a man who is finally 
broken by the tensions between the demands of external life and the 
desires of his inner life" (p. 91). Kuhn (1976) proposes that Werther 
represents "a universal human trait, a dissatisfaction with reality 
that produces a certain longing after something beyond the mortal con­
dition, a restless striving that, at least in life, is condemned to 
remain unsatisfied. The background of unfulfilled aspirations is 
ennui" (p. 168). Thorlby (1976) intends to discuss Goethe's creative 
process, or genius, and points to Werther as a means to illustrate "the 
distinction between reality and imagination" (p. 150), "the relationship 
of the outer to the inner world" (p. 151), "the relationship of imagina­
tion— and in particular the literary imagination— to life" (p. 151). 
According to his analysis, "the blurring of the distinction between 
literature and life is what Werther is all about" (p. 155). In an 
essay by Stelnhauer (1974), Werther is acclaimed as "a magnificent psy­
chological study of a modern type: the neurotic artist-intellectual"
(p. 9). Steinhauer (1970) interprets Werther as "the destruction of
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an extreme idealist by his contact with inexorable reality" (p. 118).
It is described in the following language:
Werther is not primarily a novel about a tragic love, but a 
profound character study of a psychological type who has 
become more and more central in our Western culture: the 
disillusioned or frustrated man, who cannot find a place 
for himself in society; for whom all life turns sour and 
the world becomes a prison; in whom these sentiments or 
attitudes assume pathological intensity (p. 108).
Atkins (1948a) perceives Werther's suffering in terms of a sort of idle­
ness or inactivity (TrSgheit). Werther's tragedy is that he has "a 
highly developed inner life not balanced by any corresponding degree of 
external activity" (p. 549). Atkins maintains that "the disproportion 
between speculation and activity . . .  is fatal for Werther" (p. 549).
He also believes that the novel should be analyzed as a process of 
behavior and comments that "the interest of the novel is not in why 
Werther behaves as he does, but in how he will behave under given con­
ditions" (p. 568). In a later analysis, Atkins (1949) labels the novel 
as an "objective study of self-destructive speculation" (p. 1). Clark 
(1947) writes that Werther is physically normal but that his "trouble 
is strictly psychic. He thirsts to know the innate constitution of 
things, the whole; but that constitution . . .  is unknowable" (p. 275). 
Werther manifests an unwillingness to recognize that "the individual is 
foredoomed to perceive always only a part of the whole, since the whole 
itself is absolutely unknowable" (p. 275). MolnAr(1969), in a related 
line of thought, states that man is able to know the world within cer­
tain limits but that "the price of knowledge is isolation from the pure 
object, from the objective totality for which he never ceeses to yearn" 
(p. 232). Werther is an individual who "translates this yearning into
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a search within his own limited realm which he may conduct . . . with 
resigned despair tempered only by the thought that the farce may be dis­
continued at will as soon as its futility becomes unendurable" (p. 232). 
Bragg (1976) assumes that "Werther is an exposition of Goethe's basic 
theories of psychology" (p. 132). The novel, he concludes, "is a delin­
eation of the functions of the human brain and the social ramifications 
of unequal endowment with these powers" (p. 137). Morgan (1957), in 
the introduction to his translation of Werther, declares it to be "the 
first psychological novel in German" (p. vii), and Weigand (1962) is of 
the opinion that "the story has a powerful appeal for the psychologically 
oriented reader who follows the stages of the hero's mental disintegra­
tion with rapt fascination" (p. viii). Brinkmann (1976) stresses the 
concepts of individuality and subjectivity, and Graham (1973) emphasizes 
that "Goethe's novel is concerned, with inwardness, with its tragic uncre- 
ativity as well as with the undying glory of its impulse" (p. 118).
Riggan (1973) thinks he has found in Werther "the artist, the man of 
powerful sensibility and sensitivity and of sudden passion, the man of 
the present" (p. 253). He reports on the following effect of the novel:
[Werther] firmly established in world literature a new hero- 
type: the young man of extreme emotionalism, of subject­
ivism bordering on the narcissistic, of sensibility . . . 
of an inner dichotomy prefiguring that which was later to 
erupt in Faust, and of profound loneliness and Weltschmerz 
(p. 252).
Fricke (1950, pp. 33-39) emphasizes the intensity of Werther's emotion­
ally created world and the meaning of the eighteenth-century Storm and 
Stress (Sturm und Drang) conception of genius for young Goethe. Good- 
heart (1968) identifies the subservience of Werther to his heart and
makes the following remark:
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This is the blasphemy of the cult of feeling: the implicit 
belief that personal suffering has no boundaries. God, 
society, mortality: all give way to an all-encompassing 
suffering. Werther's suicide is a supreme manifestation 
of this exaltation of suffering (p. 73).
Goodheart then adds that "the self (the I) is the ultimate referent of 
all of Werther’s feelings and actions" (p. 66). He suggests, in refer­
ence to Werther, that "the real theme of the book is his uncertain self- 
esteem” (p. 67). Introductory remarks to Stahl's (1942/1964) translation 
of Werther suppose that "the problem of the self is presented as a tragic 
conflict between the equally justifiable, but irreconcilable values of 
self-expression and self-control" (p. ix). Werther is depicted by Goethe 
as "a man diseased by his own introspectiveness, rendered impotent by 
extreme self-esteem" (p, xix). He is a character who disintegrates 
"through a lack of balance in the exercise of both rational and emotive 
powers" (p. xx). Korff (1954, p. 297) is attracted to the idea that the 
power of the self can create its own conception of the world. In other 
words, the world for Werther is represented by his own way of looking 
at, or perceiving, things. Blackall (1976) contends that "the work is 
to be concerned with man's attempt to construct an artificial world as 
a surrogate for reality" (p. 21). What Werther creates is "an artifi­
cial order based not on any relationship of the Individual to what lies 
outside himself, but on a total absorption in his own thoughts" (p. 23). 
Blackall concludes that "his dilemma is his inability to accept any 
reality outside of and independent of himself" (p. 27). Lange (1949/1962) 
discusses the novel in terms of "the condition of a supremely sensitive, 
but supremely unstable human being" (p. vi). He perceives Werther to be 
"a young man who is crushed and destroyed by the unbearable weight of
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his own passions'* (p. vi). Dieckmann (1974), in a complimentary observa­
tion, assumes that "it is the total abandonment to his emotion which 
makes Werther so disturbing to the reader. No struggle, no attempt to 
control his love, no sense of responsibility— all these terms are phan­
toms in the presence of his sweeping emotion" (p. 117). Dieckmann speaks 
of "the shockingly self-centered quality of his emotions" (p. 119) and 
declares that "Werther*s egocentricitv . . . knows no bounds" (p. 119). 
Reiss (1971) concurs with this stress on the emotions and writes that 
"the centre of the work is Werther*s inner experience, and his experi­
ence is determined by his emotions" (p. 24). He explains that '’emotion 
dominates Werther*s thought and activity. He is neither able nor will­
ing to master his feelings" (p. 26). Reiss believes that Goethe has 
presented "an analysis of a neurotic personality” (p. 45). His conclu­
sion is that "Werther is the work in which Goethe sought to come to 
terms with the role and function of feeling in life" (p. 52). Maurer 
(1958-1959) maintains the psychological thread by interpreting the con­
flict within Werther as "the clash of passion ending tragically in face 
of the realities of life" (p. 378). Trilling and Engelberg both focus 
on the element of consciousness. Trilling (1972) speaks in Hegelian 
terms of "the conception of the disintegrated, alienated, and distraught 
consciousness" (p. 47). Of the two main divisions in Werther, "the first 
is an account of the hero's effort to ward off the encroachment of dis­
integration, to remain an honest soul; the second tells of his free 
choice of disintegration" (p. 48). Engelberg (1972) addresses the ques­
tion of Werther*s sufferings and is convinced that they "are precisely
those of a man whose conscience cannot confront his consciousness when
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it reveals to him the process of accelerating the failure of achieving
all goals" (p. 67). Wilkinson and Willoughby (1962), however, maintain
that "Werther exhibits the psychical structure of the. SchwSrmer" (p. 46).
They explain the novel as follows:
[It exhibits] the calamitous effects of what the eighteenth 
century called Schwarmerei, or Enthusiasm; by which it under­
stood, not intensity of feeling, but a tendency to exalt that 
which is within . . .  at the expense of that which is without, 
to press impatiently for immediate realization of what the 
mind can envisage while ignoring the claims of the factual 
situation (p. 43).
Feise (1914) is convinced that "Werther is personified youth" (p. 289) 
and that for him to be even considered as a married man x</ould be con­
tradictory (1926, p. 222). Fairley (1947) has determined that Werther 
is merely an extension of young Goethe’s state of mind. It is an 
adolescent mind that "is a state of confusion, of darkness, of emotion 
running riot, of complete and acknowledged unintellectuality" (p. 47), 
Fairley states the following with regard to the immature Werther:
He affects us rather as one who is at the beginning of 
life and who fails as yet to perceive any order in it 
whatsoever. He finds himself surrounded by chaos or by 
illimitable forces that he cannot comprehend and it is 
these forces that overpower him at the last (p. 47).
Sociological Interpretations
Lukdcs (1968) is a contemporary European author who espouses a 
sociological Interpretation of Werther. Lukdcs emphatically claims 
that "Werther is the culmination of young Goethe's struggles for the 
free and universally developed man" (p. 44). He explains that "Werther's 
conflict, Werther's tragedy is the tragedy of bourgeois humanism and 
shows the insoluble conflict between the free and full development of 
personality and bourgeois society itself" (p. 45). Leppmann (1961)
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says that Goethe's novel "combines the appeal of a superbly written love
story with the analysis of a quite specific sociological case history:
that of a man for whom the fashionable prejudices of the time loom as
tragic obstacles which cannot be overcome" (p. 17). Hatfield (1963)
writes that Goethe's intention "to portray a suicide with such empathy
and power, to contrast the delicate, charismatic young man to the
unfeeling world of bourgeois respectability and aristocratic pride,
was a defiant challenge to the age" (p. 38). Silz Q972) focuses on
the middle-class limitations of Lotte. He suggests the following:
The middle-class mind, so sure of its decisions within 
accepted norms, soon becomes helpless when confronted 
with the extraordinary. One of its dubious resources is 
silence, a stubborn or timid failure to communicate.
This is a factor in typical bourgeois tragedies, and is 
illustrat i by Lotte's later course (p. 130).
Fiedler (1951/1955) finds Werther to be "the first anti-bourgeois novel"l "  ' “  V  ' . ■ ’ i .
(p. 183) and "an attack on the role of woman in the middle-class world"
(p. 183). Fiedler believes that "the essential subject of the Werther 
novel is always innocence and decadence— what is innocence and how can 
it be preserved in a corrupt world?" (p. 186). Ames (1977) identifies 
the. bourgeois notion of competitiveness as a key element in the novel. 
Werther "competes to surpass Albert, the ultimate bourgeois, in both 
emotional capacity and practical success" (p. 138). Apparently, the 
sorrows of Werther "result from his inability to achieve in this life 
unity of emotional and practical superiority which would prove to him­
self and to others that he is truly an extraordinary man" (p. 138). 
Hazard (1954) presents the following judgment in reference to 
eighteenth-century European thought:
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When he created Werther, the youthful Goethe had a new 
human type in mind. In Werther’s case love would be but 
one more addition to the intolerable burden of one whom 
society ir -itated and life embittered, one whose dearest 
wish was to mingle, beyond the grave, with the spirit of 
the Universe (p. 281).
Atkins (1949, p. 70) points to the Storm and Stress ideology of anti­
social individualism apparent in the novel, and Stahl (1942/1964), in 
fundamental agreement, adds that "Werther's search is a quest for a 
society which could not be found in his day— a society in which the 
individual could be preserved in his rights, yet also merge with 
others" (p. xv). Korff (1954, p. 303) reports of Werther's negative 
relationship to bourgeois society, and Lange (1949/1962) represents 
Werther as a youth who "found himself sadly, even tragically, in con­
flict with an insensible society, [so] that he could not maintain 
himself in a world which persisted in Its conventional and emotional 
habits" (p. vi). Goethe had described, according to Lange, the "nearly 
irreconcilable tension between the creative and irrational powers of 
the individual and the compulsion of the objective world" (p. xii) .
In a later essay, Lange (1953) speaks of the "conflict between sensi­
bility and the social order" (p. 44). He concentrates on this assess­
ment of the period in which the novel took form and writes the following:
[Goethe] offers . . .  an extraordinarily detailed picture of 
that spiritual dilemma in which the sentimental mind found 
itself— to live in an obsolescent and confined society in 
which yet here and there new and revolutionary energies of 
feeling and speculation emerged— energies, however, which 
with all their intensity remained inarticulate because 
suitable and generally intelligible terms for them had 
not yet evolved (p. 34).
MUller (1969, pp. 6-8) believes that Werther symbolizes the transition 
from a feudal to a bourgeois society and that through him are legitimized
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the morality and mores of this new world. Muller also claims that 
Werther is the first novel of eighteenth-century German literature to 
have depicted and acknowledged the modern world of conflict within the 
context of society as a whole. To conclude this discussion of psycho­
logical and sociological interpretations, Steinhauer (1974) admits of 
the relationship between these two seemingly diverse approaches to the 
novel by writing that "Werther is a masterly psychological study of a 
young man rebelling against society" (p. 6). He is led to assert that 
"Werther is the first novel that deals mainly with this conflict between 
nature and culture" (p. 7).
Themes
Salm (1973) introduces the theme of existentialism into his
analysis of Goethe's novel. He contends the following:
When the structure of Werther is seen in the light of those 
aspects of the novel which tend to place it in the company 
of existentialist literature, it becomes possible to see a 
connection between its tragic form and the sense of a futile 
thrashing about in an absurd world (pp. 54-55).
Salm emphasizes "Werther1s alienation from the surrounding life of nature 
and society and his nightmarish sense of the irrationality that pervades 
all existence" (p. 51). Dye (1975) alerts the reader to "the accusatory 
tendency in Werther, the sense of conflict which permeates the book 
between man and his world and thus mar. and his Creator, the implicit 
existential cry" (p. 316). The novel depicts the world in the follow­
ing manner:
It is the idea conveyed that the vorld is an intrinsically 
inhospitable environment for such a creature as man and that 
God is either non-existent or a mysterious stranger. The 
book’s equation of the unattainable with the most desirable 
amounted to an assertion of the disharmony in the universe 
(p. 313).
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Dye desired to illuminate what he calls "the work’s main challenge: its 
implicit claim that there is no correlation in the cosmos to man's yearn­
ings" (p. 327). Parry (1963) is of the opinion that "Werther's cry of 
despair reverberates through literature. When the structure of life 
becomes disjointed and seems to spin out of control the fragments are 
terrifying" (p. 92). There is a "sense of terrible abandonment" (p. 96) 
about Wertber as he reveals "the tone of a man whose predicament is 
existential" (p. 96). Fricke (1950, p. 60), in his essay on Goethe's 
Werther, offers the generalization that what happens in ail eminent 
poetic creations is the transformation of the world as it is into 
grandiose images of what it could ».nd should be. Boerner (1968b, 
p. 264) senses this tragic conflict of the individual with the inevit- 
able course of events in life. He attributes Werther's downfall to the 
disproportion between the world and the man of sentimentality and inspir­
ation. Werther is broken by the excess of his feelings and his inherent 
nature. Atkins (1949), in expressing his views on the theme of Werther 
and the world, states the following:
A frustrated generation sensed in the novel the poetic 
representation of its own spiritual crisis, for Werther's 
suicide was the outstanding expression, in the form of an 
action, of the doubts which many had about the value of 
life in what was no longer felt to be the best of all 
possible worlds (p. 65).
Another indictment of the world in which man finds himself is given by 
Butler (1958) who feels that Werther represents "an individual isolated 
from society by the misery of its suffering and finding no redress in 
the universe which appears totally indifferent" (p. 258). Korff (1954, 
p. 296) is convinced that Goethe has presented the unrequited love of 
a sentimental man for a world which everywhere refuses to grant the
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infinite demands of his inner self. To reinforce this notion, Korff 
(p. 307) asserts that the suffering of Werther ultimately brings before 
God a mute accusation against the world. Feise (1914) writes that 
Goethe depicts a "Werther who, living in his own world of ideals, is 
shipwrecked in the encounter with hostile reality" (p. 257). Blackall 
(1976) contends that "the novel . . .  is concerned with the ’sufferings' 
of a man attempting to find some order of existence into which he can 
integrate himself without losing himself" (p. 39). The heart of 
Blackall's position is that "ultimately the book is about the quest 
for order— order not in the sense of social or domestic order, but as 
the basic ontological necessity" (p. 40). Lange (1953) decides that 
the "demonstration of the tragic condition of life is, in varying set­
tings, the central motif of all of Goethe's fiction" (p. 54). Conse­
quently, Werther becomes "the portrait of an eccentric in a world that 
has itself lost its centre" (p. 37). Goethe strove to convey Werther's 
"discovery of an inevitable sense of loneliness, the recognition of the 
void which he must bring himself to accent" (p. 37). Lange speaks of 
the "Wertherian experience of a dissolving universe, held together 
only by the intensity of a restless mind, clinging, not to dubious 
reality, but to remembered, filtered, and reassociated fragments of 
feeling, observation, and learning" (pp. 38-39). There is in the novel 
"that predominant element of abysmal loneliness from which only tor­
rential speech offers relief" (p. 39). Lange concludes that Goethe 
has written an "account of a crumbling world" (p. 40). It is the 
tragic state of "a world of ever decreasing vitality" (p. 43). Spann 
(1972) views the period in which Werther was conceived as "a time of
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crumbling values" (p. 77). He defines the sufferings of Werther as the 
"sorrows of the Vest" (p. 74) and is persuaded that the concern of the 
novel is with specific ethical values which remain appropriate even for 
the modern world of today. Hatch (1974) stresses the theme of human 
relationships in Goethe’s novel. She declares that "Werther's devotion 
to his friend Wilhelm and his love for Lotte are aspects of his aware­
ness of himself in relation to others, of his sympathetic participation 
in the experience and being of another person" (p. 110). Hatch is con­
vinced that for Werther "it is the conviction that what matters is being 
a human being and enjoying intimacy with other human beings" (p. 109). 
Dieckmann (1962a) investigates Goethe’s attitude toward different types 
of freedom and applies a portion of her findings to Werther. She states 
that "Werther belongs to the category of unfree characters" (p. 29) and 
makes the following generalization: "One might almost divide Goethe's 
characters into those who act according to their own free choice and 
those who do not. All the demonic characters, the driven ones, belong 
in the latter category: Werther, Eduard, Orest, Tasso, Faust" (p. 29). 
Brickman (1949), interested in the educational application of the novel., 
proposes that "Goethe’s basic educational ideals are individualism in 
Die Leiden des jungen Werthers" (p. 147). In an assessment of Werther 
by Stahl (1942/1964), it is suggested that "God is the ultimate centre 
of his thought" (p. xvi). Stahl expands upon this notion by explaining 
that "it is the relation between Werther and his God rather than between 
him and his fellow men that gives us the clearest indication of his 
malady" (p. xvi). Staiger (1952/1960, pp. 166-173) speaks of Werther 
in terms of the totality of man and of the oneness, or unity, of body
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and soul. He considers Werther's passionate speech, as well as his love,
to be inspired by the experience that man is an inseparable whole,
Blackall (1976) thinks that the book depicts the following:
It deals with man's struggle for self-fulfillment with refer­
ence to what lies outside the self, for realization of self 
without total retreat into the self. Werther falls: he 
does retreat into the self and the self disintegrates because 
nothing outside it really had independent validity for him 
(pp. 39-40).
Stahl (1949) clarifies what he considers to be the main cause of 
Werther's misanthropy. He writes that Werther "perishes because he 
is tormented by the instability of life. Instead of participating in 
its constant ebb and flow, he is detached from the life-giving force, 
and remains a mere spectator of the great cycle of change (p, 49).
In introducing his translation of Werther, Lange (1949/1962) decides 
that "in the experience of human insufficiency lies, ultimately, the 
key to Werther" (p. viii). He also comments upon young Goethe's 
"assertions of the creative freedom of the individual" (p. vii) and 
the relevance of this notion for the novel. Reiss (197.1) concurs 
with the emphasis on the theme of freedom and focuses upon elements 
within the book that imply "the pol rity which determines Werther's 
inner life, the conflict between the limitations imposed upon man and 
his urge for freedom" (p. 37). Beutler (.1969, p. 148) bridges the 
categories of theme and motif with his reference tc Goethe's repeti­
tious use of the word heart. This term emerges again and again in 
the letters of Werther and is the theme, according to Beutler, that
dominates the entire novel.
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Motifs
Of the variety of motifs identified and examined within the 
novel, suicide is undoubtedly the most recurrent. Diez (1936) empha­
tically concludes that "Werther's suicide is the principal theme, the 
most important event and climax of the whole development" (p. 830). 
Wilson (1975) supposes that "Werther seeks death as the only avenue 
to freedom and fulfillment of his nature" (p. 105). Wilson asserts 
that "the freedom which Werther seeks is a release frora the prison of 
his own self-destructive soul, which . . .  is overheated and run wild; 
suicide is thus an affirmation of the conditions of immortality"
(p. 106). Feuerlicht (1978) can find no reason for Werther's suicide 
other than his suicidal drive. Werther’s death instinct equates to 
"an irrational death wish" (p. 479). The relation between suicide, and 
the Oedipus complex is described by Faber (1973). He reports that "the 
separation that stands behind Werther*s tragic behavior, including his 
suicidal death, is the separation from the mother" (p. 244). Faber is 
certain that "in the character of Werther we behold a human being whose 
regressive inability to separate from the maternal figure provokes his 
regressive attachment to Charlotte and ultimately his suicidal death" 
(pp. 275-276). Salm (1973) perceives Werther's suicide as an act of 
metaphysical rebellion. He maintains that "it is possible to see 
Werther's act not only as a defeat but also as a rebellion against 
his Einschrankung, his incarceration behind thick walls of illusion 
which he is vainly struggling to break down" (p. 51). Ittner (1942) 
discusses Werther's suicide in terms of the feeling of sinfulness for 
having caused Lotte to endure such great unhappiness. Ittner declares
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that "consciousness of guilt and a desire to atone for such guilt form 
a motif in the novel and this must be considered as the immediate . , . 
cause of Werther’s death" (p. 421). As Werther contemplates and actu­
ally accomplishes his own death, Ittner contends that Goethe has created 
a character "who finally takes cognizance of the institutions and the 
standards of the world,, and who acknowledge.'; them by sacrificing him­
self" (p. 426). In their observations of Werther, Dukas and Lawson 
(1969) remark that "having failed to form understanding relationships 
with the people in day-to-day life . . . the superfluous man, seeks, 
like Werther, to create a situation from which there is only one 
escape: death" (p. 151). Victor (1949) mentions, in reference to 
the novel, that "suicide is here presented as the necessary conse­
quence of a passion whose power transcended the ’bounds of humanity’" 
(pp. 33-34). Borgese (1950) contends that "Werther is the myth of 
suicide, death in surrender" (p. 3). Korff (1954, p. 296) emphasizes 
Werther's self-destruction too, and believes this element of suicide 
to be the innermost idea of the work. Korff points out that Goethe 
described those "Faustian" men of that time who were bound together 
in their uncertainty over life by a deep and grave disposition toward 
suicide. Fetzer (1971) analyzes what he calls "the principal gesture 
in Goethe's novel: the. embrace" (p. 87). The three types of embraces 
as determined by Fetzer (tne cosmic, the concrete, and the empty) all 
represent stages through which Werther progresses. Schumann (1956) 
extracts the notion of polarity from the book and discusses in his 
article "the entire polarity of Werther: Werther the genius of feel­
ing . . . Werther the victim of emotional self-pampering" (p. 535).
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Neumann (1973) is curious as to Werther's ability as a lawyer and wishes 
"to see then if his legal activity, or lack of it at times, in any way 
contributed to his end" (p. 219). He expresses the opinion that Werther 
is "a young lawyer whose self-doubts devour him" (p. 222). Diez (1936) 
is intrigued by Goethe's use of metaphorical language in Werther. He 
speaks of "the theme which is to dominate both the story and the imag­
ery of its language: the analogy and relationship of physical and men­
tal suffering" (p. 832). Diez further recognizes that "the metaphors 
taken from death, sickness, and pain saturate and flavor the language 
of Werther throughout, and when lifted out of the text, form a great 
cycle of closely related and interwoven imagery" (p. 989). Goethe had 
apparently realized "the relation of the world of emotions and the mind 
to the human body and its organs . . . and the importance of the rela­
tion for linguistic expression" (p. 1005). From her detailed study of 
Goethe and Werther, Graham (1977) offers the following insight:
Only in its form had the metamorphosis its author had under­
gone in the process of composing found its proper precipitate.
Only there— not in its Stoff— was he to be found. Not to 
understand the form of his book was not to understand the 
book; worse still, it was not to understand the san the 
author had become in the writing of it (pp. 31-32).
Tobol and Washington (1977) concentrate on Goethe's motif of Homer as 
read by Werther. They write that "Homer has served his narrative pur­
pose, underscoring with the connotative power of literary allusion the 
changes in Werther*s perception of reality and foreshadowing his demise" 
(p. 601). Tobol and Washington affirm that "Werther’s selective reading 
of Homer . . . drew his sensitive spirit into delusions from which there 
was no return" (p. 601). Butler (1958) isolates the element of time and 
reports that "in Werther . . . time marks and accelerates the progress
42
of an incurable disease and is one of the actively destructive agents" 
(p. 248). According to Butler * there is "a double time in the novel.
In fact one is almost forced to discriminate between 'real time' and 
the 'emotional time'" (pp. 248-249). McCormick (1976) argues that the 
landscape descriptions in Werther are psychologically intended to 
express aspects of human behavior. He concludes that "to see without 
being seen . . . and thereby both to enjoy landscape aesthetically and 
to render it familiar, destroying what is unknown in it, is to appro­
priate the world. This is, in a broad symbolic sense, what Werther 
does" (p. 206). Forster, Dvoretzky, and Graham each focus upon the 
significance of Lessing's drama, Emilia Galotti, to Werther. Forster 
(1958) assumes that the message of Emilia Galotti "is the message of 
the whole play, not of any particular scene" (p. 45). He acknowledges 
the placement of the drama in Goethe's novel with the following assess­
ment :
Werther himself saw the parallels between his own situation 
and that in Lessing's play. He was in that frame of mind 
in which one applies everything one reads to one's own case.
He cannot well have failed to see the affinity of the 
Prince's character to his own. . . . And so Werther, con­
scious of his temptation to murder, sees it reflected in 
Lessing's play (pp. 43-44).
Dvoretzky (1962) claims that "Werther is, after all, a psychological
novel" (p. 25). He then draws the implication that "Emilia Galotti
is a symbol in Goethe's eyes for death or its imminent approach"
(pp. 25-26). Graham (1962) develops the connection of Lessing's
drama to Goethe's novel by discussing the relationship between
Goethe and his Werther. She writes the following:
If it [Werther] tells us anything about its author, it is 
that here is indeed a master of his medium; one who has 
decisively severed his fate from that of his hero in that
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he has conquered both the external medium of his craft and 
the internal medium of his creative depths. It tells us 
so by its inner form, and by what we now recognize to be 
a profoundly ambiguous and ironical poetic symbol: the 
symbol of Emilia Galotti (p. 24),
Literary Genre
Goethe’s short novel has also been portrayed as representing a
specific literary genre. This fourth category in the review of Werther-
ian literature will be a brief summary concerning two of the more well-
known classifications: (a> a story of love, and (b) an example of the
eighteenth-century literature of sentiment. Atkins (1949) addresses
the former designation by expressing his view that "so long as feeling
and suffering are in some sense one, it may be said that Werther has
properly been called a book of eternal love" (p. 218). Bullock (1932)
included this work in his review of three thwarted romances. Bullock
asserts the follox^ing about Werther:
[It] described, x*ith a minimum of concrete incident and with 
a maximum of passionate description and sentimentally specu­
lative digression, philosophical and social, a supersensi­
tive young man's enamorment with an exquisitely virtuous 
young woman, and the effect wrought upon his battered soul 
by her marriage to another (p. 431).
Victor (1949) is a spokesman for placing the novel in the latter cate­
gory of literary genres. He announces that "it is the state of his 
generation's soul which Goethe sets forth in Werther" (p. 28). Vietor 
expands upon this statement by observing in the book "the softening and 
the excess of emotion which we call sentimentality. A tense and ideal­
istic youth found itself cut off from the world of great action, worthy 
achievement, and lofty striving by an antiquated social order" (p. 29). 
The result for these young men was that "the fulfillment which they
could not find in active life they were forced to seek in inward exis­
tence" (p. 33). Atkins (1949) echoes this opinion when he affirms that 
Goethe’s novel was "an example of the international literature of senti­
ment which flourished in the latter half of the eighteenth century"
(p. 4). He regards Werther as "a sentimental novel in which could be 
recognized familiar elements of melancholy, pathos, despair, social 
revolt, and idealized nature" (p. 65). Korff (1954, p, 297) is con­
vinced that Werther embodies the inspired, sentimental man more clearly 
than any other figure of Storm and Stress fiction. Weigand (1962) 
assumes that contemporary readers perceive the novel "as a highly 
illuminating, vivid, and colorful document reflecting the Zeitgeist 
of the ’age of sentiment’" (p. vii). Gray (1967) is convinced that 
"Werther's feelings are those of an extreme sentimentalist" (p. 49).
He proposes that Goethe "had drawn a picture of a youth from his day, 
overjoyed at the emotions aroused in him by the scenes of Nature, wide 
open to every impression, living from moment to moment at an intensity 
almost unbearable" (p. 49). In a variation on the application of senti­
mentality to Werther, Dleckmann (1974) explains as follows:
We are not dealing with a "sentimental" work, but rather 
with a beautifully constructed novel which deliberately 
presents the tragedy of a sentimental hero in a nonsenti- 
tnental mode. It is not the author, but his character,
Werther, who is sentimental (p. 113).
Trunz (1951/1963, pp. 551-553) is somewhat more general and universal
in his comments about the position of the novel in the literary world.
He observes that it was by writing Werther that the first modern German
novel was brought into being. For Germany, Trunz declares, Goethe's
book was the beginning of modern prose.
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As is evident from this survey of the literature, there has been 
neither an intensive nor extensive study of the novel Werther from the 
stance of Goethe's epistemology. The novel has been approached almost 
exclusively by way of its literary merit, leaving its potentiality as 
a learning construct to go virtually unrealized. Research and writing 
which does relate to the epistemological aspects of both Goethe and 
the novel will be incorporated into chapter IV of the dissertation. 
Literature concerning the educational significance of specific learn­
ing principles derived from the premises of Goethe's epistemology will 
be surveyed in chapter V of the dissertation.
CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STUDY
Goethe’s concepts of the human will, the self, responsibility, 
choice, and growth will be identified and subsequently utilized as the 
skeletal frame from which to construct the working principles of his 
thought process. By focusing on Goethe's actual thinking and how he 
comes to know, the novel and its interpretation become a means, or 
mode, with which to illustrate the epistemological functioning of his 
mind. In looking at the intellective totality of the man, Goethe's 
potentiality as a learning theorist is recognized.
Goethe's epistemology manifests itself through an analytical 
study of the character Werther. In order to define Goethe’s theory of 
knowledge, however, it is necessary to determine its application. This 
means that the constituent elements of Goethe's epistemology both flow 
into and out of the novel. It is a cycle that provides for a unified 
and consistent philosophy of knowledge. The identification of Goethe 
as an epistemologist is accordingly brought to the novel and provides 
the basis for its interpretation.
Within the novel Werther, Goethe presents a learning construct. 
This construct will be defined by means of its premises as determined 
from within the context of the novel. Learning principles can then be 
derived from these premises. By thinking through the premises of the 
construct and setting up a parallelism between the premises and the
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evolving principles, attention will be centered on the philosophy 
inherent in the principles. Employing a methodology that conceives of 
the novel as a medium from which learning principles are to be distilled 
and extracted permits the focus of this analysis to be on the movement 
from the validation of the premises to the unfolding of the principles. 
From within the novel, the implications for educational theory will be 
realized through the development of specific learning principles.
Goethe injected the elements of his epistemology into the lit­
erary composition of the novel. As a result, Werther became the proto­
type for Goethe's theory of knowledge. Schaub (1933) addressed the 
following remarks in observance of the centennial of Goethe's death:
Nevertheless, we may say of him, as of other thinkers who 
exhibit less change and diversity, that certain of his 
major doctrines and leading ideas were rooted in and 
express a nature which was at least relatively permanent 
and which manifested itself both within and throughout 
the flux and shiftings of passing years (p. 145).
The epistemological framework that Goethe constructed for the novel 
Werther was' to be the permanent structure upon which he built his 
literary corpus. In order to pursue a critical examination of 
Werther's self and his relationships, research questions will be 
formulated by identifying major learning concepts and premises 
within the fabric of the novel itself. The nature of the questions 
posited in this study are as follows: (a) What is the responsibility 
of the human will in the learning process? (b) What is the responsi­
bility of the self to itself? (c) What did Goethe recognize as being 
fundamental to the growth process? (d) What are the educational impli­
cations of identifying the learning act as a process of self- 
examination? and (e) What is the nature of the responsibility
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inherent in freedom of choice? These questions, based on Goethe's pre­
mises concerning the human will, the self, responsibility, choice, and 
growth will guide the analysis and interpretation of the novel. After 
revealing the facets of his epistemology, Goethe's educational prin­
ciples will be brought, to the surface and subsequently explained.
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH
Interpretation of the Novel
If there is to be any understanding of the novel's epistemo­
logical structure as erected by Goethe, a ciitical study of the char­
acter Werther is essential. It is Werther's response to events, as 
well as his relationships with others and with his own self, which 
reflect the premises of Goethe's theory of learning.
Goethe presents the confrontation of Werther with the problem
of the human will and its function in the letter of May 22, 1771.
Werther reflects on the following:
That the life of man is but a dream is a though** which has 
occurred to many people, and I myself am constantjlv haunted 
by it. When I see the limitations which imprison the active 
and speculative faculties of man; when I see how all human 
activity is directed toward procuring satisfaction for needs 
that have no other purpose than prolonging our mfserable 
existence; when I see, moreover, how any comfort we may 
derive from certain points of inquiry is merely a dream­
like kind of resignation, in which we paint our prison walls 
with gaily colored figures and luminous prospects— all this, 
Wilhelm, leaves me speechless. I withdraw into my inner 
self and there discover a world— a world, it is true, rather 
of vague perceptions and dim desires than of creative power 
and vital force. And then everything swims before my senses, 
and I go on smilxng at the outer world like someone in a 
dream (Goethe 1971, pp. 11-12).
Werther is lamenting the fact that his inner world lacks clarity and 
substance. It is a world of imagination to which is opposed the outer 
world of reality. Because Werther rejects any relation with reality, 
he is caught between both worlds. He seems to be acting from premises
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that ate based upon phantoms of his own fabrication. It is comfortable 
for Werther to react and respond in such a ma>ner since he has no real 
conception of his inner nature, and he denies any participation in the 
external realm of existence. Werther's failure as a man, then, is his 
refusal to accept the inherent epistemological responsibility for deter­
mining and giving essence to the inner world of the self. His bitter 
complaint in regard to the limitations of mankind has only a scant foun­
dation, In actuality, the confinement that Werther thinks he has 
uncovered and justly denounced is self-imposed. That the life of man 
appears as merely an image in the mind of Werther accents the absence 
of a process of intellective validation resting upon an empirical base.
A complimentary passage that further reveals the nature of 
Werther's perception is the episode with the youthful farm hand.
Werther immediately empathizes with the country lad's amorous plight.
The young man describes with passionate subjectivity the features and 
qualities of the x<?idow by x**hom he is employed. Werther is overcome 
by his emotions and concludes the letter of May 30, 1771, with the 
following statement:
I shall try to see her as soon as possible, or rather, after 
giving it a second thought, I shall avoid her. It is better 
that I see her through the eyes of her lover; she might not 
appear to my own eyes, in reality, as I now see her; and x̂ hy 
should I destroy the lovely image I already possess? (Goethe 
1971, p. 20).
Werther is again turning away from what is real toward a xrorld of emo- 
rional fantasy. This is the way he intends to keep matters. It. is what 
he is insistent upon if reality is to be fended off. Werther’s eventual 
relationship xv'ith Lotce will be based not on the true nature of her own 
self but rather on his self-concei\ed image of her inner character.
51
Werther!s reference to the insubstantial quality of the world 
about him is delineated to his confidant in the letter of July 18,
1771:
Wilhelm, what would the world mean to our hearts without 
love! What is a magic lantern without its lamp! As soon 
as you insert the little lamp, then the most colorful pic­
tures are thrown on your white wall. And even though they 
are nothing but fleeting phantoms, they make us happy as 
we stand before them like little boys, delighted at the 
miraculous visions (Goethe 1971, pp, 47-48).
Werther is confronting the domain of reality with that of appearance. 
Like the shackled prisoners described by Plato (1941/1965, chap. 25) 
in the cave allegory, Werther observes but does not perceive. He only 
sees exactly what he wants to see and thereby excludes the will’s 
insistence that his self experience what it confronts. If the legit­
imacy of its emotions are not questioned and validated, the heart too 
will provide only reflections and visions. Perception implies a 
process of evaluation. In other words, there is the empirical need 
for relationships to develop in order for the mind to become, more 
fully conscious. Confrontation with the reiallty of existence, rather 
than a mode of self-acquiescence, is demanded by the will whenever the 
intellective process is fully in balance.
In the letter of August 8, 1771, Goethe portrays the extent to
which Werther has succumbed to the process of rationalization. Several
questions are posed by Werther in the following paragraph:
But can you demand it of the unhappy man whose whole life 
is slowly and irremediably wasting away of a lingering 
disease; c^n you demand that he should make a definite end 
of his misery by the stab of a dagger? And does not the 
disease, at the very same time that it burns up his strength, 
also destroy the courage he needs to free himself from it?
(Goethe 1971, p. 54).
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Werther wants to convince himself that his malady and suffering are the 
result of an external determinant. He believes his misfortune to be 
analogous to the physical problem of disease and desires to feel as if 
he has no control over the matter itself or its implications. In his 
essay on Werther, Mann (1941/1968, p. 344) elucidates Werther's situa­
tion through an analysis of Goethe’s intention with respect to events 
in the novel. Mann, concentrating on the character of Werther as hero 
and correspondent, claims that Werther is young Goethe himself. Sig­
nificantly absent in Werther, however, is the creative talent with 
which nature endowed the living Goethe. Werther has no other mission 
on earth besides his suffering in life, concludes Mann, and so he has 
to perish. Mann’s analysis implies that Goethe was equating the crea­
tive act with the learning act. Learning is the realization of new 
relationships and the subsequent actualization of their potentialities. 
Creativity is the development of new potentiality between relationships. 
If Werther is, as Mann suggests, the figure of Goethe but without his 
ability for creativity, what remains is an individual who is minus the 
will to learn, or grow, or create. The implication is that man dies 
when he no longer grows. He stops living when he stops growing. To 
stop the growth process, as in the case of Werther, is suicide. Goethe 
was aware that all learning is creative in essence because the self, as 
a self-determiner, is constantly involved in the process of designing 
its future. Learning and living are the recognition and the accept­
ance of the need to never stop. The self must will to live by expe­
riencing the learning process. Graham (1973) identified this notion 
of Goethe's and succinctly wrote that "'he lived in order to write"
53
(p. 135). Writing was a learning process, in the case of Goethe, through 
which both he and his reading public were educated. Although Werther, in 
his letter of August 8, 1771, makes reference to the similarity of his 
condition to that of an individual with an incurable disease, there is 
actually no physical reason for him to die. Werther has no choice, 
therefore, but to take his own life if he is to die. His turmoil is 
self-imposed, and Werther realizes that his sorrows alone are not cap­
able of depriving him of the courage necessary to free himself from such 
tumult. Mann (1941/1968, p. 348) considers the struggle with this 
dilemma as one of the strongest motives for Werther's suicide. Although 
he may strongly desire to relinquish all sense of control to an external 
force, Werther vaguely recognizes that even the will to be determined 
has its source within the self. Ultimately it is alwayi the internal 
which brings about that which the self wills.
In the conclusion of his letter of August 8, 1771, Werther men­
tions how he happened upon his diary, which he had temporarily disre­
garded. He writes, "I am amazed how I ran into this situation with 
full awareness, step by step. How clearly I have seen my condition, 
yet how childishly I have acted. How clearly I still see it, and yet 
show no signs of improvement" (Goethe 1971, p. 54). In yet another 
passage, Werther's heightened sense of awareness and ability to self- 
analyze is clearly in evidence. The letter is dated November 3, 1772, 
and occurs in the second part of the novel. Werther declares:
Oh, if I only could have moods, could shift the blame on the 
weather, a third person, or on an unsuccessful enterprise, 
then only half the weight of this unbearable burden of dis­
content would rest on me. Miserable me! I know only tec 
well that the fault is with me alone— not fault! Enough, 
the source cf all my misery is hidden in myself as was for­
merly the source of all my happiness (Goethe 1971, pp. 113—
114).
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Werther has an awareness of his condition, but he lacks any control over 
it. 3y allowing his self to succumb to the process of rationalization, 
Werther has willed chat he become a fully determined being. He possesses 
knowledge and, as a result, knows what he should do but refuses to act 
accordingly. It is the responsibility inherent in awareness to develop, 
expand, and generate a greater depth of consciousness within the mind in 
order to realize the meaning and application of knowledge. Peterson 
(1970) addresses a similar problem when he discusses the "cycle of con­
sciousness" in the following paragraph:
The cycle of consciousness is an important factor in the psy­
chological make-up of the learner. As a construct it carries 
with it the realization that learning builds upon previous 
learning, in a sense, gathering momentum as each fact is 
added to what is in the process of becoming a whole. An 
integral part of this process is the developing conscious­
ness which accompanies the comprehension of meaning and under­
standing. To understand meaning is to be conscious of its 
application and implication. Learning and its spirit is the 
originator of the value condition. To place value upon a fact 
is to find relevancy in that fact; this is its condition.
From within the cycle of consciousness the value condition 
prompts the learner to question the reliability and validity 
of the material of knowledge. It determines the importance 
of the subject for the learner. To determine importance is 
to recognize the applicability of the subject to a personal 
need. Thus, the spirit of learning motivates and permits the 
cycle of consciousness to fulfill its purpose (pp. 52-53).
Peterson implies a need for the will to act from an empirical base. This 
recognition of the cognitive domain is entirely supplanted by Werther 
with a realm of emotion and feeling. The problem, however, is not that 
of the cognitive in opposition, to the affective but rather of determin­
ing the legitimacy of that feeling and emotion. There must be a reason, 
a purpose, and a sense of control in both the cognitive and affective 
domains. What Werther failed to do was to validate with his own mind 
and thereby establish a relationship between the cognitive and affective
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constructs of the mind. Because he did not build an empirical structure 
on which his will could act, Werther was Incapable of validating the 
specificity of objects for himself.
Eventually and irrevocably the consumption of Werther's entire
being commences. In the powerful and intense letter of December 6,
1772, the link that bridges Werther with the world of reality becomes
a mere thread. Werther cries out in his agony over Lotte:
How her image haunts met Awake or asleep, she fills my 
entire being. Here, when I close my eyes, here, in my 
forehead, at the focus of my inner vision, her dark ayes 
remain. Here! but I cannot put it into words. When I 
close my eyes, they are there; like an ocean, like an 
abyss, they lie before me, in me, taking hold of all my 
thoughts (Goethe 1971, p. 124).
Werther has become a fully determined being; that is, he is being lived 
by external determinants rather than living according to his own powers 
of self-determination. Through the process of rationalization, his 
intellective processes were not permitted to feed his will with crite­
ria based on honesty. He sealed his own fate by consuming nothing but 
untruth and therefore relinquished his freedom. At this point of total 
dishonesty with himself, Werther renounced his responsibility to the 
self. He had willed that his self become externally determined. 
Goethe's method of conveying this message to the reader is to have 
the. "editor," at this particular juncture, assume the responsibility 
of directly transmitting the final course of events within the novel. 
Peterson (1977c), in his book on the human will, states the nature of 
the relationship between the will and responsibility in these terms:
While the learner may be subject to determinants, external or 
internal in nature, it is intellective stance (the total intel­
lective process) which governs whether or not he will allow 
himself to be determined, or will exert his intellectual and
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willful powers of nelf-determination. It is our contention 
that responsibility, as we are using it here, is rightfully 
assumed only when the powers of self-determination ar a exer­
cised (p. 20).
Of course, Werr.her' s powers of self-determination have been willfully
depleted, and Peterson (1977c) reminds the reader of the following:
The degree of responsibility will be in keeping with the 
degree of awareness found in the consciousness of the 
learner. How conscious is he of his responsibility as 
a self-determiner? Without this consciousness, the will 
will realize that the mind subjects itself to determinants 
which may assume all responsibility for what is done (p. 20).
In this case, it is the process of rationalization to which the mind of 
Werther yields. Engelberg (1972) seems to generally concur with this 
assessment of Werther's predicament as indicated in the following state­
ment :
[Werther is] in quest of the increasing certainty that there 
is some unity of being, some correspondence, as it was later 
to be called, between perception (consciousness) and knowl­
edge (conscience), between what a man felt and what he 
valued, One may put the last; point even more emphatically: 
what a man feels must be of value (p. 74),
In other words, the knowledge that resides in consciousness carries value
as its meaning is revealed through the empirical thrusts of awareness
(conscience). Rather than will a confrontation with his consciousness
in order to validate this knowledge fur himself, Werther continues to
impose a system of values determined by the rationalization process. He
therefore wills a perception which the truth of awareness would deny.
Engelberg (1972) acknowledges Werther*s self-deception and states the
following:
He alone bestows values, and it is the terrible disparity 
between perception and value that destroys his quest for 
unity and hai*mony. After all the point is that Werther’s 
"distemper" is a symptom of his frustration, bis inability,
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finally, to unite perception and knowledge, for knowledge 
relentlessly contravenes whatever value he places— or 
forces— upon his perceptions (p. 75),
Consequently, Werther’s will functions upon a foundation of untruth that
permits him neither to learn nor to grow.
It is apparent that Werther does not possess a clear sense of 
responsibility toward his self. Following his initial encounter with 
Lotte, Werther declares, in the letter of June 19, 1771, that "for me 
there is neither day or night, and the entire universe about me has 
ceased to exist" (Goethe 1971, p. 32). Although he has not determined 
the value or meaningfulness of this relationship, Werther begins to 
regard Lotte as his sole reason for existence. In fact, several weeks 
later, on July 1, 1771, Werther exclaims, "0 angel, for your sake I 
must live!" (Goethe 1971, p. 41). If Werther is not even able to live 
for himself, than how can he live for the sake of another? Since 
Werther perceives Lotte and the rest of the world not as they really 
are but as he wishes and desires them to be, lie would be living a 
life of contradiction. By willing to be dishonest with himself,
Werther refuses to accept the demands of responsibility. The conse­
quence of such £i course of action is obvious. In the second part of 
the novel, on the evening of October 27, 1772, Werther dishearteningly 
observes, "I have so much in me, and the feeling for her absorbs it 
all; I have so much, and without her it all comes to nothing" (Goethe 
1971, p. 113). Werther is suffering from his abdication of responsi­
bility toward the self. An observation is offered by Peterson (1977c): 
"It is only the self-determined mind which is willing to accept respon­
sibility for its actions; and, of course, responsibility accepted as
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such, is the working hypothesis from which the intellective process 
moves” (p. 99). Werther has willed, however, that the movement of his 
intellective process be subject to the demands of external determinants.
A rather peculiar allusion is made by Werther, in the letter of
July 16, 1771, when he asserts that "a secret force [eine geheime Kraft]
drives me forward again, although everything swims before my eyes"
(Goethe 1971, p. 46). A suggestion consistent with Werther's character
would identify this concealed force as his will. It is a will that is
activated by a mind that lacks its self-corrective measure. Peterson
(1977c) provides the following comment:
While it is the mind which rationalizes, it is also the mind 
which serves as its own self-corrective; one of the largest 
areas of responsibility lies in studying the many faces of 
rationalization. This is not to suggest that the mind is 
at odds with this ever-present activity; it simply demands 
to be in control of it. The mind, then, makes a distinction 
between the cognitive process and the processes of rationali­
zation. It is rationalization which must be tested by the 
cognitive process and ultimately the entire intellective 
process, including the affective and conative (p. 15).
Werther is essentially being driven by a will which he has not accepted
the responsibility to validate.
A glaring paradox is evident in the letter of July 20, 1771.
In his reply to Wilhelm, Werther asks:
Am I not now active? and does it make any real difference 
whether I count peas or lentils? As everything in the 
world amounts after all to nothing to speak of, a person 
who drudges for the sake of others, for money or honors 
or what not, without following his own ambition, his own 
need, is always a fool (Goethe 1971, p. 49).
In order for Werther to realize and validate his own needs and ambitions,
it is necessary for him to establish a relationship to the self.
Peterson (1970) writes the following explanation:
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For man to be the subject of personal human reaction is to 
take it for granted that the self exists; but how he exists 
and why changes his relationship Jo the self. What is_ the 
self then becomes the most important concern of the indi- 
idual. To ask: who am I? and find the answer is to real­
ize that the goal of the individual is to be able to iden­
tify with the self (p. 14).
It is not possible for Werther to know his self because he has denied 
himself the responsibilities inherent in self-determination. Ortega 
(1949/1968), in reference to Werther's notion of activity, personifies 
the phenomenon of life in an imaginary conversation with Werther and 
exclaims, "'It is not enough to act; you have to make your your abso­
lutely individual destiny. You have to make up your mind irremediably. 
To live fully is to be something irrevocably'" (p. 167). Ortega is 
speaking of the will to design, or realize, the relationship to the 
self. As a fully determined being, Werther does not will to experi­
ence, to know, or to learn. He devices the meaning of the world 
because he places no value on his own existence in it.
Wilhelm has written concerning the strained and precarious rela­
tionship between Lotte and Werther. On August 8, 1771, Werther answers 
the argument of his confidant and maintains the following:
In this world we are seldom faced with an Either-Or; all 
emotions and modes of actions show as many varieties of 
shape and shading as exist between a hooked nose and one 
that is turned up. So you won't be angry with me when I 
grant your whole argument, and yet continue in my attempt 
to slip in between the Either and the Or (Goethe 1971, 
p. 53).
Werther is rationalizing again. He does not comprehend that the need and 
responsibility to choose is decisive. Peterson (1970) writes the follow­
ing:
[Man] exit's as a man because he possesses the power and 
insight found in choice. Whatever he does is the result 
of choice; this is one thing he is unable to escape. It
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determines his relationship to the self as well as to others; 
it is the key of his detemunac ive powers of consciousness.
. . . Man creates his own life and does this by finding mean­
ing in all of existence; he does this by means of using the 
opportunities afforded him in choice (p. 17).
Werther stagnates and decays because his mind is so determined that it
lacks the freedom and will to make a valid choice.
On August 22, 1771, Werther astutely comments, "If we fail our­
selves, evt_iy thing fails us" (Goethe 1971, p. 67). He lacks a basic 
faith in himself and is unable to value and find meaning. Peterson 
(1970) realizes that "freedom provides the setting out of which values 
evolve. . . . Meaning is found when value is realized; value is real­
ized only because freedom exercises its responsibilities to the self"
(p. 15). Werther has lost his freedom and given up the attendant 
responsibilities inherent in freedom. In the same letter he continues:
The minister has liked me for a long time, and has fre­
quently urged me to devote myself to some work; and some­
times, for an hour or so, it seems the thing to do. But 
when I come to consider it a little later, I remember the 
fable of the horse which, tired of its freedom, let itself 
be harnesssed and was ridden to death (Goethe 1971, pp. 67- 
68).
Whether he actually works or not is of little concern, for in neither 
case is Werther free. His self-imposed limitations have in effect 
"saddled and harnessed" his own self.
As the second part of the novel proceeds, Werther renounces all 
sense of accountability to himself and others. He writes to Wilhelm, 
on March 24, 1772, the following words: "And therefore-— sugar the bit­
ter pill for my mother. I cannot help myself, and she must put up with 
the fact that I cannot help her either" (Goethe 1971, p. 93). Werther 
acknowledges now that he will act, as he previously did, without fully
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validating Che reasons for his actions. His reactions will be sponta­
neous and impulsive. Rationalization and dishonesty have reached such 
a proportion in Werther that he is reluctant to blame himself for what 
is happening. It is easy for him to make these statements of surrender 
and deception because all that he has to do is point toward some exter­
nal factor that has supposedly led to his downfall. Underneath this 
facade, though, Werther dimly recognizes that it is really what is 
inside him (the internal) that is out of balance. At the end of the 
letter of August 18, 1771, lie inserts the fallowing message of despair:
My heart is instead worn out by the consuming power latent 
in the whole of Nature which has formed nothing that will 
not destroy its neighbor and itself. So I stagger with 
anxiety, Heaven and Earth and their weaving powers around 
me! I see nothing but an eternally devouring and ruminat­
ing monster (Goethe 1971, p. 66)., f
Vlhat Werther sees, in reality, is a reflection of his self. He is dis­
integrating and feeding his own consumptive process very rapidly. 
Werther literally devours himself, and the pace continues until the 
"editor" finally has to directly continue relating the course of the 
novel.
Floundering in the emptiness of his self, Werther sends an 
intense and emotionally charged letter to Wilhelm on November 15, 
1772. He asks:
And why must I be ashamed at the terrible moment when my 
whole life trembles between being and not-being; when the 
past flashes like lightning over the gloomy abyss of the 
future and everything around me collapses, and the world 
is destroyed with roe*-is it not then the voice of a crea­
ture thrown completely on his own resources, who has 
failed himself and is resistlessly plunging into the 
abyss, that grinds out the cry, "My God! My God! why 
hast Thou forsaken me?" (Goethe 1971, p, 116),
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Because he has not established a responsible relationship to his self, 
Werther is again attempting to transfer the cause of his sufferings onto 
an external determinant. As a determined and unfree, being, he denies 
ilruost all responsibility for the condition of his life. Werther feels 
that he is alone in the world,and his lack of control over the forces 
that confront him only increase his sense of helplessness and impend­
ing doom.
Goethe powerfully depicts the relationship between responsibility 
and the self in the letter of November 30, 1772. Werther is confronted 
by a man named Heinrich, who has lost his sanity (because of an unre­
quited love for Lotte), and he probes the peculiar nature of this man by 
means of conversation. Heinrich's mother soon arrives in search of her 
son, and Werther takes this opportunity to ask for an explanation con­
cerning one of Heinrich's statements. Werther wants to know the follow­
ing:
"What did he mean when he spoke of a time when he was so 
happy and well off?”— "The foolish fellow!" she cried, 
with a compassionate smile, "by that he means the time 
when he was out of his mind; he always praises those 
days; it was when he wa3 at the asylum and did not know 
himself" (Goethe 1971, p, 121).
Heinrich had become mentally crippled because he no longer recognized 
his own self. His happiness was part of the paradisiacal delusion that 
his self had surrendered to while in the asylum. Werther was now set 
face to face with the realization that by not accepting the responsibil­
ity to know the self, the path leading tower;! madness or eventual suicide 
was inevitable. Peterson (1970) makes the following statement in regard
to man:
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His greatest problem is to know himself. Meaningfully, he 
cannot know the world of persons and things and understand 
their implicative values until his studied reactions have 
affected his experiential constructs. To know himself as an 
individual means his mind is open to all of the possible con­
frontations of the morrow; he is aware of the meaningfulness 
of internal experiences, what is happening around him, as well 
as those things which may have an effect upon his existence 
Cpp. 16-17).
Werther refused the responsibility of self-confrontation and chose to 
turn away from it. Ultimately he imprisoned himself in his own world 
of rationalization and was left with only the expedient of suicide by 
which to flee his entrapment.
A self-determined mind is a mind that has willed to choose. 
Inherent in choice is a great deal of responsibility. It is the knowl­
edge that the self can become known and defined only by means of the 
creative element of choice. Peterson (1970) clarifies this notion with 
a single question and answer:
What does it mean to assume the rola of creation and recog­
nize the underlying responsibilities inherent in making a 
choice? It is done by questioning the meaning of one's own 
existence, but first knowing what it means to exist and what 
is required by the mind to determine its own validity 
(pp. 14-15).
Goethe deals with this matter in the character of Werther. Very early 
ir. the novel, on May 13, 1771, Werther reveals to his friend Wilhelm 
that, "I treat my poor heart, moreover, as though it were a sick child 
and satisfy all its desires" (Goethe 1971, pp. 7-8). In other words, 
it is the heart, or the affective, which is determining the actions and 
behavior of Werther. lie does not understand that it is the nature of 
the relationship between the cognitive and the affective that permits 
the will to act. Werther must determine the legitimacy of the affective 
domain. It is only when the cognitive, affective, and conative domains
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of the intellect are in balance that the mind's self-corrective process 
will properly function. Without the function of self-correction, Werther 
cannot be assured of making the valid choices required for the process of 
self-determination.
Peterson (.1970) writes that "freedom is the opportunity to think 
and to act freely" (p. 16). It would appear that Werther is subscribing 
to such a notion in two of his letters. On May 22, 1771, he concludes 
with a discussion on mankind and the world by remarking, "And, then, how­
ever confined he [man] may be, he still holds forever in his heart the 
sweet feeling of freedom, and knows that he can leave this prison when­
ever he likes" (Goethe 1971, p. 13). In the second part of the novel, 
on March 16, 1772, Werther sends the following description:
Today I have taken up a knife a dozen times, intending to 
relieve with it my suffocating heart. I have been told 
that a noble bread of horses, when overheated and hunted 
almost to death, will by instinct bite open a vein and so 
recover their breath. I often feel the same. I should 
like to open one of my veins and gain eternal freedom for 
myself (Goethe 1971, p. 92).
Are these statements by Werther, however, actually examples of the con­
cepts of freedom and free choice? Peterson (1977c) suggests that "it is 
the individual who must be free to act, and when he does act, what he 
has done has been done freely, and the free action then has been 
chosen. . . .  If the action is not free, the choice likewise cannot 
be free" (p. 88). He explains further that "it is the depth of poten­
tial freedom which gives to value its meaning. Then, when a choice is 
made from among alternatives, it is willed because of what the choice 
can come to mean because of the degree of freedom it can bring to the 
mind" (Peterson 1977c, p. 93). Werther does not have enough faith in
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mankind to realize "hat. life is confinement and the world is a prison 
only if man determines it to be so. He is content to be manipulated 
and controlled by external forces and events, secure in the belief that 
he can rationalize his own self-destruction. In an explanation appli­
cable to Wertherfs dilemma, Peterson (1977c) states: "If the mind is 
not a self-determiner, then it is determined by conditions which take 
from it both authority and responsibility. This implies there is no 
freedom of choice, nor is there potentiality for freedom" (p. 93). 
Werther is not free because he has willed to lead a life based on, and 
determined by, dishonesty and untruth. In distinction to his reference 
about the noble horses, Werther’s condition is of his own making 
(choice).
Werther relates a discussion concerning the conflicting senti­
ments between himself and Albert over the issue of suicide. On August 12, 
1771, he writes:
"Why must people like you," I exclaimed, "when you discuss 
any action, immediately say: 'This is foolish, this is wise; 
this is good, that is bad!’ And what does it all mean? Does 
it mean that you have really discovered the inner circum­
stances of an action? Do you know how to explain definitely 
the reason why it happened, why it had to happen?" (Goethe.
1971, p. 57).
Werther seems to recognize that there are causes of certain forces and 
events over which the self has absolutely no control. Yet, at the same 
time, he refuses to admit that the self does have control over the impli­
cations of cause if it exercises its responsibility of free choice. 
Peterson (1970) insists on the following:
To be human is to recognize the potentiality of choice. . . .
And to think he [man] can escape any part of existence is not 
a problem; the problem lies in what he brings by way of men­
tal and spiritual ammunition to the confrontation. To
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determine the validity of these needs is to emphasize the 
futility of even playing with the concept of escape; no one 
can escape from the self. Rather, to meet every confronta­
tion ably prepared is his task (p. 17).
Werther thinks that he can escape from his self through suicide. He
chooses not to accept the responsibility of affecting the implications
of cause that confront him. To be a self-determiner would upset the
comfort and security of Werther's irrational (in the sense of mentally
closed) existence.
When the opportunity for free choice is obstructed, man begins
to suffer from a loss of humanness. In a letter dated January 20, 1772,
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and sent to Wilhelm, Werther confides:
V  #•.***»■ ah,#" ,How dried up my senses are getting to be; not for one min­
ute does my heart overflow— not one blissful hour! Nothing!
Nothing! I seem to be standing before a sort of raree show, 
watching the little men and little horses jerk before my 
eyes; and I often ask myself if everything is not an optical 
illusion. I join in the play or, rather, I am moved about 
like a marionette, and sometimes, when I grasp the wooden 
hand of my neighbor, I shrink back with a shudder (Goethe 
1971, p. 84).
This is the despairing plight of a fully determined being. Werther does 
not have the freedom to assess the value of life or the value of his fel­
low man. Peterson (1977c) proposes that "man does not possess dignity 
if he is not free to make choices, and do so as a self-determining mind; 
the will is free only in the self-determined mind" (p. 101). Werther is 
unable to dialogue or feel a sense of mutuality in his relationships with 
himself or others. His will is not free to validate the nature of any of 
his relationships and, consequently, meaning and purpose have no applica­
tion for him.
Shortly before the "editor" assumes the obligation of directly 
relating the final events in Goethe's novel, Werther's facade begins to
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weaken. He has a growing awareness of what he is suffering from and 
cries out to his confidant in the letter dated November 30, 1772, "I 
cannot, I cannot regain my balance! Wherever I go I am faced with an 
apparition which completely upsets me. Today! 0 Destiny! 0 Mankind!" 
(Goethe 1971, p. 119). This vision which Werther faces, as if he is 
looking into a mirror, is a reflection of the truth that he has been 
denying for too long. It is a truth that lies far below the surface 
of Werther's self-imposed facade. Peterson (iy/7c) asserts the follow­
ing:
It is only the self-determined mind which is free to choose 
its epistemological destiny. Since it is either determined, 
or becomes a self-determiner, and what is determined cannot 
be free, the mind, if it wills to be free must first will to 
be self-determined. Freedom is the opportunity to make use 
of the potentialities of the mind; when it makes use of these 
opportunities, it is exercising its option of responsibility 
and acts morally (p. 48).
The effect of what this truth would mean and demand if Werther saw it in 
terms of its reality and its implications would be overwhelming. Werther, 
in fact, ultimately suffers from this disparity between the freedom of 
self-determination and the untruth of rationalization.
Goethe's Epistemology
That Goethe wrote Werther for reasons other than the mere presen­
tation of an entertaining autobiographical novel of unrequited love is of 
great significance. He himself writes of his intention in the thirteenth 
chapter of the Autobiography:
It cannot be expected of the public that it should receive an 
intellectual work [ein geistiges Werk] intellectually. In 
fact, it was only the subject, the material part that was con­
sidered, as I had already found to be the case Cutong my own 
friends; while at the same time arose that old prejudice, 
associated with the dignity of a printed book,— that it ought
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tc have a moral aim [einen didaktlschen Zweckj. But a true 
picture of life has none. It neither approves nor censures, 
but develops sentiments and actions in their consequences, 
and thereby enlightens and instructs [erleuchtet und belehrt]
(Goethe 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 219-220).
In order to ascertain the manner and content of Goethe’s enlightenment 
and instruction, it is necessary to fit together the epistemological 
pieces that are dispersed within the context of his short novel.
Goethe’s foremost concern in life was the search for, and realiza­
tion of, his own self. Ortega (1950) is convinced that "Goethe traversed 
his life in search of Goethe, in search of that figure of himself which 
he felt called upon to realize, to bring into the real" (p. 356). 
Schweitzer (1950/1961) writes, "From adolescence to old age, he [Goethe] 
is profoundly ana seriously concerned with himself" (p. 60). Eecon (1934) 
is in agreement with these observations and offers the following support:
The education and expression of self were, after all, the 
dominant interests of his [Goethe's] life and in all his 
daily activities as well as in all his works, in his plays, 
novels, conversations, and diaries, in these "fragments of 
a great confession," we find abundant evidence of this 
fact (p. 148).
Goethe did indeed mention repeatedly how important knowledge of the self 
was. In a letter to von Leonhard, dated October 12, ISO/, he remarks 
that "there would be much less disputing about objects of knowledge, 
their derivation and explanation, I am convinced, if everyone knew him­
self above all" (Goethe 1949, p. 116). Goethe (1949) similarly declares, 
in the essay "Shakespeare and No End," that "the highest stage man can 
reach is to be conscious of his own thoughts and sentiments, to know him­
self" (pp. 204-205). The sixteenth book of Goethe's Autobiography con­
tains a passage in which are cited the adverse consequences of inhibiting
the realization of the self:
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Our physical as well as our social life, manners, customs, 
worldly wisdom, philosophy, religion, and many an acciden­
tal event, all call upon us to deny ourselves. Much that 
is most inwardly peculiar to us we are not allowed to 
develop; much that we need from without for the completion 
of our character is withheld; while, on the. other hand, so 
much is forced upon us which is as alien to us as it is 
burdensome. We are robbed of all we have laboriously 
acquired for ourselves, or friendly circumstances have 
bestowed upon us; and, before we can see clearly what we 
are, we find, ourselves compelled to part with our person­
ality, piece by piece, till at last it is gone altogether 
(Goethe 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 307-308).
This notion of understanding the self was crucial for Goethe's episte­
mology. It was the foundation from which the structure of his entire 
philosophy would arise.
Goethe was aware that man’s most salient confrontation was with 
the self. The problem that resulted was that man has got to use the 
self in order to define it. It is in the interaction of relationships 
that the self acts most distinctly. Bergstraesser (1960), in an article 
that considers Goethe’s idea of a new society, stresses the concept of 
relationships and asserts that "his [Goethe’s] will to reform begins 
with man’s relation to others and to himself" (p. 38). Goethe (1949) 
himself maintains that "man knows himself only in so far as he knows 
the world, becoming aware of it only in himself, and of himself only 
in it" (p. 207). Willoughby (1950) echoes Goethe’s sentiments concern­
ing the nature of relationships and responds that "it is only by finding 
oneself reflected in others that a man becomes conscious of his own 
worth" (p. 18). Willoughby (1950) continues and emphasizes that Goethe 
was definitely aware of "the heightened consciousness of existence which 
comes from seeing ourselves reflected in the lives of others" (p. 27). 
Dieckmann (1962b), in accordance with these statements, acknowledges
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"Goethe's firm belief that man understands himself only if he sees him­
self reflected in the outside world" (p. 173). In one of his many 
aphorisms Goethe (1949) cautions, "Keep a moderate watch upon yourself 
in order that you may become aware of your relations as regards your 
fellow-men and the world" (p. 209). He also adds, in a letter to 
Auguste Stolberg, dated February 13, 1775, "One does not get to know 
that one exists until one rediscovers oneself in others" (Goethe 1949, 
p. 159). In the fourteenth chapter of the Autobiography, Goethe reit­
erates his contention that the self is known only through the nature of 
the relationships that it establishes with others. He provides the fol­
lowing comment about man:
9 * 1
If he wishes to form a just and independent judgment, he 
must, before all things, convince himself of the worth of 
his fellow citizens; he must learn to know them; he must 
Inquire into their sentiments and their capacities; and 
thus, in aiming to read others, he becomes intimate with 
his own bosom (Goethe 1969, Vol. 2, p. 242).
Because this confrontation of the self with itself and with other selves 
is a cyclical process, Goethe had come to the realization that the rela­
tionships he participated in with others were totally dependent upon the 
nature of the relationship he had with himself. Without acknowledging 
this factor, he could not progress further in his growth and episte­
mological development.
What does this intensive concentration by Goethe on the self and 
the qualities of a relationship imply? Goethe himself gives a succinct 
answer. He replies through the character Ottilia, in the novel. Elective 
Affinities, that "the proper study of mankind is man" (Goethe 1949, 
p. 157). In a conversation with his secretary Eckermann, Goethe (1949)
declares:
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I have always regarded a nan as a self-contained individual 
whom it was up to me to explore and cose to know in his 
pecularity, without demanding any sympathetic response on 
his part. By this means 1 have learned how to handle all 
sorts of men; and it is only in this way that one comes to 
know the varieties of human character and learns how to get 
on in life (p. 154).
A passage from Goethe's novel Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship concisely 
states, "The most interesting object to man is man; perhaps he should be 
the exclusive object of interest" (Goethe 1949, p. 159). The focal point, 
then, is man and how he comes to know himself through the relationships 
he establishes in life. Schweitzer (1950/1961), in his 1949 address at 
Aspen, Colorado, in commemoration of the bicentenary of Goethe's birth, 
captured the essence of Goethe's lifelong pursuit when he declared, 
"Goethe's work, therefore, is concerned with the philosophy of a genuine 
and profoundly healthy hunc’- understanding” (p. 42). Goethe is asking 
man to recognize and understand himself in order that he may be able to 
assume the human responsibilities of self-examination and self- 
determination.
To know the self is to realize the good. Goethe (1949) writes, 
in a letter to von Knebel, dated April 8, 1812, that "we act well, 
strictly speaking, only in so far as we are acquainted with ourselves.
If we are. in the dark concerning ourselves we are not likely to succeed 
in doing what is good in the right way, which amounts to the good not 
being done at all" (p. 204). In other words, the self must intend the 
good by recognizing the Inherent implications residing in choice.
Peterson (1977c) explains that "intention wants me to make the best 
possible choice. . . .  It is intention which constantly suggests the 
need, r.ot so much to make a choice, as to make the best possible choice,
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taking ail conditions into consideration" (p. 97). Choice is a means to 
an end. It is an end not in the sense of finality, but rather it is an 
end in a mode of continual transformation. The self is saying that it 
is never going to reach this end because it sees the potential within 
to transcend, to move beyond the end. It is the realization that choice 
leads to growth and growth leads to self-enhancement. Schweitzer (1949b) 
expresses a similar understanding when he claims that "Goethe recognizes 
that the way he must travel for himself is a way of self-improvement"
(p. 44). In terms of his literary creations, "it is he himself who 
appears ever and again in different forms, striving with an incorrup­
tible sense of reality to find, through all his mistakes and failure, 
the upward way" (Schweitzer 1949b, p. 44). Schweitzer (1949b) contin­
ues by admitting the following about Goethe:
He who saw even before Nietzsche that the great problem is 
how man’s realization of nobility, which is self-realization, 
and his achievement of goodness are related to each other—  
and therein lies his own peculiar philosophical significance!—  
adopted the simple solution, that true self-realization can 
consist in nothing other than true realization of goodness 
(pp. 50-51).
Goethe was also aware of the nature of the relationship between knowledge 
of the self and realization of goodness brought about through learning. 
Within the novel Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, he incorporates the 
following paragraph:
I can take pleasure only in a mail who knows what is good for 
himself and others and who works to limit his arbitrary cap­
rice. Everyone's hands are at work molding his own fortune, 
like the plastic artist shaping his raw material. But it is 
with this art as with all others: The capacity is innate, 
but only learning and solicitous effort bring it to fruition 
(Goethe 1949, p. 164).
Goethe perceived as the responsibility of choice the creation of rela­
tionships that are learning processes. What is the nature of the
73
'-ealization of this process? Schweitzer (1949a) once again elucidates 
this matter and concludes:
Therefore, the purpose of the world is fulfilled when every 
single being fulfills his purpose, and I am free to abandon 
all thought about the meaning of the world while I simply 
devote myself to the thought that I must realize the meaning 
of my own life. And, according to Goethe, the meaning of my 
life is that I should develop the good that is in me. and 
subdue the evil that tries to retard the good. This is 
Goethe’s great teaching about the eternal (p. 97).
To attain and act on the good is to make a choice leading toward the ful­
fillment of purpose in realizing the meaning of the self in its relation­
ship to itself and to whatever it wills to confront in life.
What is needed at this point in Goethe’s philosophical evolution 
is the epistemological connective between what is good and what is truth. 
Goethe (1949) offers the following maxim: "Love of truth asserts itself 
in the ability to find and appreciate what is good wherever it be"
(p. 212). What is true is good and, conversely, what is good is true. 
Heller (1971) suggests that "truth is what man is meant to know— this is 
the center of Goethe’s intellectual existence" (p. 30)., It is the respon­
sibility of man to search for, validate, and legitimize truth. In 
another of his aphoristic remarks, Goethe (1949) writes, "If I know my 
relation to myself and the world about me, I call it Truth. In this 
way each individual can have his particular truch, and it is neverthe­
less the same truth" (p. 165). It is the same truth because the self 
is simultaneously experiencing and constructing the a priori by means 
of the will. Since the intention of the a priori is to bring about the 
fulfillment ar.d completion of the validated good, the will rejects any 
object of confrontation that does not meet this criterion. Schaub (1933) 
illuminates this aspect of truth and presents his interpretation of 
Goethe's maxim as follows:
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For, each is a self-active and unique being and possesses 
a world and a life distinctive of himself. On the other 
hand, this world, however personal and individual, is 
none the less the same as that experienced uniquely by 
every other person (p. 147).
This world is a given (a priori) and a totality which the self perceives 
in its confrontations and experiences in life. As the self experiences, 
meaning is realized, knowledge is obtained, and truth is identified. 
Schweitzer (1950/1961) affirms that "truth for Goethe is the greatest 
of all values. ’Truth is wisdom,* he asserts" (p. 44). To know and 
validate truth is to realize a major epistemological construct in the 
structure of growth.
Goethe does much more than just provide the elements from which
to erect his philosophy of knowledge. He also provides the clues with
which the entire procedure can be set in motion. In his consideration
of Goethe’s learning theory, Roubiczek (1962) writes:
Our knowledge is never absolute; we have to recognize free­
dom gradually in the course of experience; thus we can never 
know whether our aims are entirely right. We can be justi­
fied only by continual striving, by a constantly renewed 
endeavor to reconcile our external actions with those inner 
laws to which we hold (pp. 134-135).
Through continual striving the self is willing self-determination in its 
confrontations. By willing to constantly act, the self is able to valid­
ate that which it internalizes. It is this process by which the self 
learns and grows and which Goethe offers for examination and self­
utilization.
A key ingredient for further penetration into Goethe's episte­
mology is offered by Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer. Riemer (1949), who was 
a professor and librarian at the Weimar gymnasium and later a joint exe­
cutor of Goethe's posthumous works, makes the following diary entry con­
cerning one of Goethe’s novels:
75
Among the other criticisms which the Philistine reviewers 
addressed to The Elective Affinities was this, that the 
book did not make visible the conflict between duty and 
inclination. Goethe's comment to me was the following:
"The conflict takes place behind the scenes, but it is 
made clear that it must have taken place. The characters 
behave like civilized people; despite their inner conflict 
they observe an outer decorum. A moral struggle is never 
a fit object of aesthetic representation. For either 
morality triumphs or is defeated. In the first case, there 
is no reason to represent it; in the contrary case it is 
shameful to be the direct witness. . . .  In all such delin­
eations, the sensual triumphs; but its triumph is avenged 
by fate, that is, by the moral principle which rescues its 
own freedom by death. Thus Werther had to shoot himself 
after the senses had become his master. Thus Ottlie and 
Eduard had to perish after they had given free rein to 
their inclination. Therein consists the triumph of the 
moral principle" (p. 172).
To have a duty towards something is to recognize an obligation. In being 
obligated, the self perceives the inherent potentiality in the nature of 
whatever relationship it happens to establish. By fulfilling it3 obliga­
tion, the self realizes its responsibility in actualizing this potential­
ity. Meaningfulness is experienced by the self as it accepts its respon­
sibility of acting on the object of confrontation. What Goethe seems to 
imply, then, is that the self has a duty, or obligation, towards the 
moral principle. This moral principle rests upon the foundation of 
morality. Peterson (1977c) explains the matter in the following lan­
guage:
Morality is the value placed upon each existent in its crea­
tion by First Cause, and which is reflected in each existent 
as a potential to be known by the human mind as it makes the 
value its own. Morality is the opportunity to experience the 
purpose of creation by creation and actualizing its meaning.
The power of morality is lodged in the meaningfulness of the 
learning momentum, by means of which the mind appropriates 
unto itself the intentionality of First Cause (p, 50).
As a self-determiner, the self wills to experience whatever it chooses
to confront.. To experience .is to have determined meaning which is
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resident in cause. Through internalization and the subsequent applica­
tion of meaning, the self actualizes the potentiality in cause. In 
this manner, the self can validate that which is truth (the good) and 
realize the intentionality of cause. It is the absence of this process 
of evaluation, in the sense of determining a value by experiencing mean­
ing, that led Werther to his impending ruin. The potential for self­
enhancement was denied Werther because he refused to accept the demand 
of the moral principle for growth.
Man, as Goethe well knew, does not live in a vacuum. He does 
not lead a naturally isolated existence but rather shares in, and 
is an integral part of, a society. This means that the self comes into 
persistent contact with other selves. Goethe recognized the episte­
mological significance and potentiality in the interaction between two 
distinct selves as he established hxs relationships throughout life. 
Hutchins (1950) claims that "communication was the theme of Goethe's 
life. His friendships were really collaborations" (p. 390). That 
these relationships were actually learning processes is a fundamental 
premise of Goethe's epistemology. It is through the character Werther 
that Goethe provides an examination of a self moving in contradiction 
to this premise. Wilkinson (1952/1962) provides the following analysis:
For Goethe, communication with the not-self, whether objects 
or persons, is the task to which man is called and which— as 
the author of Werther knew only too well--he relinquishes at 
his peril. The very involvement of subject with world, which 
is the condition of our existence, he sees as a challenge to 
objectivity; not indeed as something out there independent of 
us waiting to be "known," but as something ever to be created—  
yet only to be created in collaboration with objects. . . .
Goethe's interest starts, in fact, where the epistemological 
statement ends: reality is neither in the subject nor in the 
object but in the activity between. His preoccupation is with 
the practical management of that activity (pp. 136-137).
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Goethe recognized that as the potentiality residing in relationships was 
actualized, the self gained a greater depth of consciousness. The mean- 
ingfulnesj of the knowledge possessed by the self increased and allowed 
for a greater self-awareness. But what was this pivotal activity that 
permitted the intercourse and reciprocal interaction between two selves? 
What was this mutual process which led to a collaborative system of 
learning and growth? Hutchins (1950) replies, "In one good Goethian 
world the Civilization of the Dialogue might arise. The essence of the 
Civilization of the Dialogue is communication. The Civilization of the 
Dialogue presupposes mutual respect and understanding. It does not pre­
suppose agreement" (p. 400). Dialogue is the self-generating source of 
power in a relationship. It is the self seeing its potentiality realized 
by interaction with another self. Dialogue does not inhibit self- 
determination but rather promotes this process through mutuality. One 
of Goethe’s (1949) many aphorisms suggests, "The question to ask is not 
whether we are perfectly agreed, but whether we are proceeding from a 
common basis of sentiment" (p. 163). Only through dialogue can mutual­
ity be experienced, and to experience mutuality is to narticipate in the 
dynamism of a creative relationship.
Goethe knew that the nature of his relationships were learning 
processes which enabled the self to grow. The manner in which he chose 
tc design these relationships, however, determined their nature. But 
how did Goethe realize the kinds of choices necessary for him to grow?
permitted h*m to then act upon these choices? Schweitzer (1949b) 
recognizes this apparent predicament and offers the following solution: 
"Goethe sees that the way he must take is this: not to impose upon
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himself anything foreign to his nature, but to let whatever good lives
and smolders in him develop and to lay aside whatever is not good in
him" (p. 36). In other words, Goethe had to discriminate between that
which did and that which did not carry value for him. Goodheart (1968)
concurs with this assessment and adds the following:
Goethe is distinguished by his capacity for assimilation 
and development: his life confirms the legend of his 
catholicity. He makes rejections, but he absorbed— or 
tried to absorb— everything of value that he had experi­
enced (p. 74).
To experience that which he validated as having value for the self became 
a process of osmosis and subsequent growth. Goethe (1969), in the elev­
enth chapter of his Autobiography, speaks of this matter:
Man may seek his higher destination on earth or in heaven, 
in the present or in the future: he yet remains on this 
account exposed to an eternal wavering, to an influence 
from without which ever disturbs him, until he once for 
all makes a resolution to declare that is right which is 
suitable to himself (Vol. 2, p. 78).
By choosing to determine for himself that which had value and meaning in 
experience, Goethe refused to succumb to the forces of external determi­
nants. He demanded instead a willful validation of whatever was neces­
sary for his self-enhancement. From the tenth chapter of the Auto­
biography comes this comment: "I knew how to value highly everything 
that contributed to my own cultivation [Bildung]" (Goethe 1969, Vol. 2, 
p. 16). That Goethe was aware of the potentiality for learning and 
growth in the relationships he chose to establish is evident. But what 
enabled him to actualize this potentiality? Once again, it is Gnothe 
(1969; himself who hints at the answer and provides the following clues 
in the seventh chapter of his Autobiography:
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And thus began that tendency from which I could not deviate 
my whole life through; namely, the tendency to turn into an 
image, into a poem, everything that delighted or troubled 
me, or otherwise occupied me, and to come to some certain 
understanding with myself upon it, that I might both rectify 
my conceptions of external things, and set my mind at rest 
about them (Vol. 1, p. 305).
Goethe had to determine a relationship with whatever he confronted. He 
had to experience in order to find meaning so that self-improvement and 
self-understanding would continue. Once the self determined the value 
of a relationship and then proceeded to internalize that value, it was 
ready for another confrontation. There was both an evaluative and an 
applicative process at work. Peterson (1977c) identifies this pivotal 
agency as the human will and insists that "to will is to determine the 
value and application of the learning objects' roeaningfulness" (p. 47). 
As the will validates the object of confrontation, it establishes for 
itself what is of value. To realize a value is to have actualized the 
object's potentiality. The will determines that which has meaning for 
the self but also applies this meaning in determining what the object 
of confrontation itself can come to be. In other words, the will pro­
vides the self with the ability to apply that which it has learned. 
Peterson (1977c) describes this action and explains:
In every object resides learning potentiality; that is, a 
potentiality to determine what the object is, but also, 
what it can become when the created mind now becomes a 
creator, bringing into being new relationships, and, 
therefore, new being. It is the morality of a knowing 
which comes from learning the meaning of cause (p. 53).
By applying what it has learned through relationships, the se1f. as a
self-determiner, achieves growth. Goethe's entire philosophy of knowl
edge thus comes full circle by way of morality and the moral principle
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Findings
Having isolated the constructs of Goethe's epistemology from the 
novel Werther, and having examined their content end meaning in terms of 
a totality, it is appropriate to return now to the novel and complete 
Goethe's philosophy of learning. Lehrs (1951), is a discussion concern­
ing Goethe and mankind, makes the following comment:
He [man] is not only fitted . . . with a once-for-all given 
mode of spiritual-physical existence peculiar to himself, 
but . . .  he is endowed with the possibility cf transit i.-..
ing his existence bv dipt r his free will— that indeed his 
manhood ased on this capacity for self-willed Becoming 
(p. 364).
To will to become is for the self to transcend itself. It is for the
self to take control, to find meaning in relationships, and to know
what it possesses and what it requires. It is to realize the meaning-
fulness of the potentiality of whatever the self confronts. Peterson
(1970) describes the process of becoming as follows:
It is a unique process, allowing the individual to transcend 
the self, take a look at the self and then decide, by means 
of his choices, how to actualize his potential. To do this 
requires the whole being; becoming involves the total self.
To do this means that as he gathers new facts about himself, 
they should have only one implicative value, namely, to open 
new channels of communication with the self in order to 
envision his own potentiality (p. 19).
Werther tried to transcend both self and world at every available oppor­
tunity throughout the entire development of the novel. This notion was 
apparent to Lange (1952), editor of a collection of German short novels 
and stories, who wrote, "His whole existence is a desperate struggle to 
transcend life itself and he desires nothing more than to communicate 
his extreme state of mind" (p. xi). In the letter of August 18, /71,
Werther himself exclaims:
Oh, the times when I longed to fly on the crane's wings, as 
it passed overhead to the shores of the illimitable ocean, 
in order to drink from the foaming cup of the Infinite an 
elating sensation of life, and to feel, if only for a 
moment, in the cramped forces of my being one drop of th- 
bliss of that Being who creates everything in and t!.. gn 
Himself (Goethe 1971, p. 65).
But transcendence is merelv n •■■ ,s for Werther by which he can escape
from himself. Just before the "editor" must assume the narration of
events, Werther expresses his sentiments in the letter to Wilhelm dated
December 6, 1772. He protests:
What is maxi, that celebrated demigod! Does he not. lack 
powers just when he needs them most? And when he soars 
with joy, or sinks into suffering, is he not in both 
cases held back and restored to dull, cold conscious­
ness at the very moment when he longs to lose himself 
in the fullness of the Infinite? (Goethe 1971, pp. 124- 
125).
Werther was unsuccessful in his attempt at transcendence because the 
nature of the relationships in which he participated were not charac­
terized by the element of self-determination. Transcendence is achieved 
only when the self assumes the quality of honesty and subsequently rises 
above the limitations that it may choose to impose upon itself. It is 
through this process that the potentiality of the human will is realized. 
In negating the positive functioning of the will by means of the process 
of rationalization, Werther denied the dynamic structure of growth resi­
dent in the transcendent factor. If the self is lost, death is imminent. 
Closs (1949), in an essay on Goethe and Kierkegaard, expressed the view 
that "life, not death, was his [Goethe's] deep concern; by life he meant 
creative activity, not a vegetative existence" (p. 266). Creativity 
implies growth and growth is the only means for self-transcendence. The 
sufferings of Werther in failing to recognize this principle validate 
the essence of Goethe's epistemology.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Principles of Learning Theory
Six educational principles have evolved from Goethe's epistemo­
logical premises as they we^e examined within the context of the novel. 
Each principle of learning will first be identified and then followed 
by a survey of pertinent educational literature. After all of the six 
principles of education have been introduced and discussed, their sig­
nificance as a totality for learning theory will be considered.
1. A primary educational principle derived from this study 
insists that the subject matter of education is man. The emphasis 
must be placed on the nature of man and his characteristics as a self­
determiner. Maritain (1943/1968) admits that "education needs primar­
ily to know what man i£, what is the nature of man and the scale of 
values it essentially involves." (p. 5). The individuality of the 
learner, then, assumes especial attention. Ortega (.1944/1966), in 
retrospect, makes the following declaration:
In education there are three elemental factors: what is 
taught (knowledge, wisc.om), and the teacher and learner.
Yet with peculiar blindness, education had centered about 
knowledge and the teacher. The learner was no factor in 
pedagogy. . . .  It is the learner and his characteristics 
which alone can guide us in our effort to make something 
organic of education (p. 46).
Eaton (1934), in his essay on Goethe’s meaning for education, writes 
that Goethe conceived education as "a being, a growing, a developing
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of individuality through adaptation to nature, accepting, discarding, 
but never reaching a definite conclusion" (p. 149). According to Eaton 
(1934), Goethe fully acknowledged throughout his life, "the corner stone 
of his educational ideas, the free development of individuality" (p. 154). 
Man and his individuality are inseparable from the recognition of the 
value man places on his self. The next principle of learning expresses 
this realization.
2. Because the self is always in relationship to the self, the 
intellective process can be understood only in terms of the self in 
relationship to the self. This implies that learning is an experience 
of each distinct self. Hill (1973) asserts that "the self . . .  is a 
choosing being, and its choices reflect not merely the objective evi­
dence of reason but the subjective passion of existence" (p. 265). In 
his discussion of epistemology, Marler (1975) recognizes the person who 
"emphasizes the inescapably personal nature of experience in which our 
choices define and reveal the self" (p. 116). Marler (1975) continues 
and states, "His choices, in turn, will indicate what knowledge he has 
taken unto himself— they will determine what he will become" (p. 135). 
John Dewey was aware of the impact that such interaction between the 
learner and the object of confrontation would have for education.
Dewey (1938/1968) insisted that "the beginning of instruction shall be 
made with the experience learners already have; that this experience 
and the capacities that have been developed during its course pro­
vide the starting point for all further learning" (p. 74). Learning 
becomes an extremely personal matter from the standpoint of the self.
As Brubacher (1969) suggests, in reference to epistemological theory
S4
and its application to method, "learning is a profound personal experi­
ence, a self-actualizing, a coming to know oneself by his own efforts. 
One learns, gets to know, what one is" (p. 222). In order for the self 
to establish sucn an educative relationship to itself, it must first 
exist as a unity and function as a totality. Maritain (1943/1968) 
observes that, "the whole work of education and teaching must tend to 
unify, not to spread out; it must strive to foster internal unity in 
man" (p. 45). Goethe himself recognized this requirement for unity if 
the self was to fulfill its obligation as a self-determiner. The fol­
lowing paragraph was written to an acquaintance of Goethe's (Schubarth) 
and dated July 8, 1818;
It is a matter of indifference in what circle we begin our 
work of self-cultivation, it is all the same from which 
point we orient the progress of our Bildung, provided there 
is a circle and there is a point of departure. To acquire 
a productive Bildung that proceeds from a nucleus should be 
a young man's concern; and even in advancing years, when 
our development broadens out along historical lines, we 
must compress the diffusion of our interests and recapture 
the sense of unity (Goethe 1949, p. 153).
Goethe astutely discusses this notion of unity in conjunction with self-
cultivation. The manner in which the self comes to know and legitimize
its knowledge becomes the substance of the third learning principle.
3. In order to learn and to know, the self must determine the 
validity and reliability of that which it seeks to k m w  (confront).
Eaton (1934) attests to this principle when he declares that "the chief 
source of Goethe's educational Ideas would seem to have been his pas­
sionate desire for self-culture and his view of man's goal" (p. 146). 
That an individual chooses to educate himself and can actually proceed 
to bring it about is of great significance. Maritain (1943/1968)
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believes that "from the very start the teacher must respect in the child 
the dignity of the mind, must appeal to the child's power of understand­
ing, and conceive of his own effort as preparing a human mind to think 
for itself" (p. 26). That the nature o! the self is affected by the 
choices made through the intellective process is apparent to Hutchins. 
Hutchins (1936/1962) proposes that "since character is the result of 
choice it is difficult to see how you can develop it; unless you train 
the mind to make intelligent choices" (p. 29). In order to make 
choices, value and meaning must be determined by the self. Hook (1946/ 
1967) enunciates this view when he writes that educational institutions 
"must strengthen the powers of independent reflection, which will enable 
students to confront the claims of ideals and values by their alterna­
tives" (p. 145). In other words, the self must validate that which it 
acts upon if it is to counter the demands of the process of rationali­
zation. Scheffler (1965/1971), in discussing aspects of St. Augustine's 
theory of teaching, provides the following comment:
The pupil who knows, Augustine seems to say, is not just 
someone who has a belief which is true, even if he has the 
belief on the highest authority (he uses Biblical examples).
He. must further have considered within himself whether what 
has been said is true. He must have engaged in a personal 
process of evaluating the belief in question. . . .  It serves 
to distinguish genuine knowing from mere true belief, by 
reference to appropriate evaluation of the belief by the 
believer: The surplus strength of knowing consists, in
short, in the knower's having adequate evidence for the 
belief in question (p. 316).
What is being suggested is that the self is provided with the empirical 
mechanism for instructing itself and subsequently determining the valid­
ity and reliability of this knowledge. Peterson (1970) calls for the 
creative teacher "to enable each student to become his own teacher"
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(p. 43). This demand is consistent with his conviction that "the aim 
of all knowledge is to permit the learner to find self-fulfillment" 
(Peterson 1970, p. 51). If the self becomes its own teacher, then the 
learning act can indeed be identified as a process of self-examination. 
The origin, or source, of this self-initiated activity must now be con­
sidered and disclosed through an assessment of the fourth principle of 
learning theory,
4, Thinking requires the interrogative mode of the intellec 
This means that to receive knowledge is not nearly as important to the 
self as is the exertion of its own inherent potentiality for knowing 
and learning. Brubacher (1977) is in agreement and declares that 
"acquiring knowledge, hence, is incidental to inquiring into knowl­
edge." (p. 96). In order to inquire into an object, however, the self 
must actively confront the object. Dewey (1938/1968) elucidates this 
matter by suggesting that "problems are the stimulus to thinking"
(p. 79). He further explains as follows:
Growth depends upon the presence of difficulty to be overcome 
by the exercise of intelligence. Once more, it is part of 
the educator's responsibility to see equally to two things:
First, that the problem grows out of the conditions of the 
experience being had in the present, and that it is within 
the range of the capacity of students; and, secondly, that 
it is such that it arouses in the learner an active quest 
for information and for production of new ideas. The new 
facts and new ideas thus obtained become the ground for fur­
ther experiences in which new problems are presented (Dewey 
1938/1968, p. 79).
Dewey Is placing the emphasis upon the learner. It is the self that must 
be internally, or intrinsically, motivated to continually seek for knowl­
edge and its truth. It is a self which is confronting objects in order 
to determine value and realize meaning. As Dewey (1938/1968) indicates,
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"The most important attitude that can be found is that of desire to go 
on learning" (p. 48). The self must be aware of a need which it strives 
to fulfill. Only through recognizing that the self possesses an inner 
vitality of its own is such a conception possible. Since the self does 
in fact move upon that which it seeks to know by means of the will, the 
next educational principle examines the consequences of this activity.
5. Because man is always in relation to that which confronts
him as a determiner, all learning is creative. Peterson (1970)
expresses his concurrence and states the following:
The learner must possess the ability to create; the patterns 
of education serve no other purpose than providing the spiri­
tual incentive for using what has been learned. To create 
anew out of how and what he has learned is an important goal 
of every learner (p. 45).
Learning becomes the main ingredient for further learning. In the 
process of this learning is seen the potential for creating that which 
the self is to become. Ortega (1944/1966) stresses that "our life is 
not given to us ready-made: in a fundamental sense it is, precisely, 
what we are constantly and continuously making of ourselves. The 
process is going on at every instant" (p. 17). This dynamic sense of 
creativity implies an educational development that sees as its aim, 
to borrow a phrase from Strain (1971) in his discussion of contemporary 
educational philosophers, "the becoming of a human person, a person who 
lives and makes decisions about what he will do and be" (pp. 473-474). 
But to be a self-determiner and to create is more than just making 
decisions. It is accepting the responsibility inherent in those deci­
sions. This is what Hook (1946/1967) demands when he replies that "it 
['moral' education] is found wherever knowledge is so taught that it
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heightens the sense of human responsibility for the inescapable deci­
sions which men must make" (p. 160). The learner is a creator and must 
accept the responsibility for the choices made and their implications.
As Peterson (1970) notes, "The learner is always the active participant 
in the learning process" (p. 10). This is the applicative dimension in 
learning theory. It is the learner beginning to actualize his choices 
through application of their meanings. To understand the method by 
which this self-realization interacts and communicates with other 
selves is the function of the sixth principle of learning,
6. A relationship which demands and insists upon a deep degree 
of mutuality is a learning process. Hill (1973) acknowledges this prin­
ciple when he declares that "good purposes are defined as those which 
promote communion between selves, fostering creativity on behalf of 
such communion" (p. 266). This too is an application of knowledge in
quest of meaning, but it occurs within a social context. It is the8
establishment of a relationship between selves in order to realize a 
potentiality that was previously nonexistent and which goes beyond 
whatever each self could accomplish in isolation. Dewey considers 
this notion of dialogue and intercommunication. He writes, "The prin­
ciple that development of experience comes about through interaction 
means that education is essentially a social process" (Dewey 1938/1968, 
p. 58). Hutchins Q936/1962) affirms the social nature of man but 
laments the virtual absence in the modern world of "any intelligible 
basis for the study of man in his relations with other men" (p. 99).
If man is a self-determiner, then, it is his nature to constantly make 
choices. Hill (1973) recognizes this characteristic of man and asserts
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that "creativity and dialogue are the channels through which his choices 
are actualized" (p. 270). As the self creates through its own process 
of determination, it must certainly be affected by the creative activity 
of other selves. Peterson (1970) perceives this interactive influence 
and suggests the following:
There is a dual focus, one beam emphasizing the individual 
and what he can make of himself through finding the meaning 
of life (for himself and the good of society), and the other 
emphasizing the resultant society and what it can mean for 
the individual (p. 13).
This is the mutuality inherent within the nature of a creative relation­
ship in which experience is shared between two selves. It is the dia­
logue, the reciprocal interaction, the meeting of ideas, the compari­
sons, the weighing and the evaluation of all that the self allows to 
confront it. In this manner, the self can determine its own nature 
and yet be an integral part of the growth and experience of other 
selves.
Implications and Applications of 
the Principles of Learning Theory
Now that each of the six principles of learning have been iden­
tified and considered individually, it remains to determine what their 
implication for education is if they are conceived in terms of a total 
and unified philosophical framework. At this juncture Peterson (1970) 
offers the following conclusion: "In a sense, education demands more 
than any one teacher can give; but, to find and give direction will 
always remain his primary task" (p. 43). It remains to delineate the 
nature of this direction, but Kill provides an invaluable insight.
He suggests the following:
90
Culture and education are most concerned with the spiritual 
or distinctively human. . . .  By proposing that educational 
theorizing should focus on the spiritual, 1 have implied that 
the desired educational outcome will be a self which is con­
sciously concerned with the problem of making consistently 
good choices (Hill 1973, p. 270).
The approach of both Peterson and Hill is applicable to learning theory 
as derived from the six educational principles. Furthermore, a syn­
thesis of their ideas is set forth by Wynne in his introductory remarks 
to Petersen's Existentialism and the Creative Teacher. Wynne (1970) 
maintains the following:
Education will actively provide to the person the direction 
needed and then permit the individual the right to choose.
It will place the decision-making emphasis on the individual; 
it will offer freedom of choice; it will demand that the per­
son who so commits himself takes the responsibility for this 
action. This freedom of choice is then not license; it is 
rather a demand for effectual commitment, commitment in the 
light of a value system that has been developed in a setting 
of self-determination and an awareness of the "other" (pp, 
viii-ix).
In order to actualize the implications that are resident in such a con­
ception of education, there must be a consistent application of the 
principles of learning theory in harmony with this notion of freedom 
of choice.
To realize the full potentiality inherent in a learning theory 
derived from these six principles of education requires an educational 
process that is humanistically oriented. A humanistic education is one 
which insists that the subject matter of education is the nature of man 
and his characteristics as a self-determiner. It will be a process that 
provides each self with the means for attaining the aim, or purpose, of 
education; that is, growth and self-enhancement. To learn, to know, 
and to subsequently evaluate the validity of this knowledge will provide
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the self with the motivation and vitality necessary in its unceasing 
pursuit of truth. An important aspect of investigating and determin­
ing the nature of truth is that sense of total self-awareness which 
is constantly striven for. Only when the self is in such a mode does 
it begin to understand the intellective process. To be able to think 
requires the interrogative state of mind. It is the perpetual quest 
for knowledge and purpose as conveyed through the word why. It is the 
ability of the self to reason and to develop intellectually. It is 
freeing the individual from biases, prejudices, and the discrete sur- 
vey of opinion. Through dialogue and the mutuality of relationships, 
a humanistic education provides the freedom to allow the individual to 
look at ideas. It is the freedom to choose as well as the responsibil­
ity to discriminate among alternative possibilities of choice. In order 
to function properly, the self must make a good choice which presupposes 
the necessity to know. In order to know the good it is essential to 
think and to be conscious of the process of thinking. Inherently 
residing within each self is the responsibility to learn, to know, to 
interact, to experience, to grow. A humanistically educated individual 
ought to manifest and exemplify each of these qualities.
The search for truth becomes one of the cornerstones in the con­
struction of a humanistic theory of learning. It, too, is based on the 
ability to think. Without the quintessential ingredient of cognition, 
there can be no formulation of propositions and concepts and no testing, 
review, restructuring, or reverification of hypotheses and premises. In 
other words, self-examination would not be possible. A major presupposi­
tion of truth is its legitimacy and validity which implies the process
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of thought. Consequently, the self is confronted with the need to dis­
criminate among a multitude of possible choices. By means of a humanis­
tic education, the structuring and subsequent validation and verifica­
tion of hypotheses ought to be facilitated and enhanced. As a resu.1 , 
this development should culminate in an individual j is aware of cer­
tain insights that are basically related to the universal element of 
choice. This knowledge and recognition of the freedom of choice ought 
to lead to the actualization of the individual's potentiality and to a 
continued sense of self-fulfillment.
Having acknowledged the fundamental relationship between freedom 
of choice and a learning theory structured from humanistic components, 
a significant factor remains. It is the recognition that not only must 
choice be consistent with the determination made by the self, but it 
should also be cognizant of the existing social context. What is being 
suggested is the notion of ideas and actions occurring within a social 
medium. It is the applicative dimension of a humanistic educational 
philosophy which is legitimized through a cycle of continuous evalua­
tion. Within contemporary society, there exists a need to Identify why 
people within the collective structure of the community think and act 
the way they do. A humanistic education ought to provide the ability 
to analyze, evaluate, validate, and respond to changing circumstances 
within society. Furthermore, the ability should exist to determine the 
true nature of change in order that it may be utilized for the benefit 
of society. People must not be taught or trained merely to habituate 
themselves to conditions. Rather than unconsciously reacting to stimuli, 
the self must first ask why such a response is being made. In other
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words, the individual must learn to think and evaluate for himself. It 
becomes important, therefore, to focus on and understand the process 
involved in achieving, coping with, responding to, and utilizing change.
A humanistically educated individual ought, then, to be able to recognize 
not only his own needs but those of the society in which he lives and to 
discern the attitudes and expectations of the community. The consequent 
logicality of approaching and confronting reality through the social con­
text of interrelationships seems apparent enough. Society also requires 
the maintenance of a mutual base of common discourse and shared values 
in order to continue existing, growing, and improving life for its mem­
bers. A humanistically based learning theory can lend itself to explor­
ing these shared values and in establishing a common understanding about 
mankind. In essence, this capability to communicate is one of the vital 
facets of a humanistic education.
It is now appropriate to draw attention to the pivotal role 
that a humanistic education can play within the multiplicity of dis­
ciplines and cognitive systems in order to prepare the self for con­
tinued learning. It is the opportunity to enhance the mind's ability 
to conceptualize (to become conscious of what is revealed by knowledge), 
to perceive and identify the relationships among a multitude of partic­
ulars, and to subsequently grasp the underlying similarities and gener­
alities. A type of interdisciplinary approach is envisioned which 
recognizes a common framework. That there might well exist a certain 
commonality or set of presuppositions upon which the various kinds of 
knowledge could structure themselves is a significant and intriguing 
proposal. By positing a foundation that serves as the unifying element
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in the totality of all the forms of knowledge, it becomes reasonable to 
always assume relationships rather than presuppose their absence..
A humanistically oriented process of learning, then, is infused 
with purpose and constantly validated through an evaluative process. It 
is an education applied within a dynamic, grox-zing, and ever changing 
social milieu. A humanistic education thus becomes a sort of self- 
education. It contributes to the individual's understanding of himself 
in connection with the mutuality of his relationships and the complex­
ity of interrelationships that constitute the reality of the world. To 
interact with these relationships, to undergo their consequences, to 
experience, and to grow* is to have acknowledged the vitality and per­
petuity of the self-determinative potentiality inherent in mankind.
Conclusions
To recapitulate the educational core of Goethe's epistemology 
will underscore its applicability to a humanistic philosophy of learn­
ing.
1. Goethe realized that the subject matter of education is 
man, and he emphasized the nature of man and his characteristics as
a self-determiner. The focus of education must therefore center upon 
the learner and his individuality.
2. Because the self is a unity and functions as a totality, 
learning becomes an experience of each distinct, or unique, self.
Being a composite of the effects of its choices, the self perceives 
learning as an extremely personal matter. This means that education 
must recognize the value that man places on his self in his demand
for self-cultivation.
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3. Goethe knew that the self can choose to educate, itself and 
actually proceed to bring this process about. Through determining the 
validity and reliability of that which it seeks to know, the learner is 
provided with an empirical base from which to begin his instruction.
In this manner, the self becomes its ox\rn teacher and the learning act 
is identified as a process of self-examination.
4. It is the self that exerts its own inherent potentiality for 
knowing and learning. Goethe recognized the internal, or intrinsic, 
motivation of the self to seek knowledge and truth, and he demanded that 
the self actively confront its learning object. Education must acknowl­
edge that the learner does indeed possess an inner vitality of his own.
5. Man is always in relation to that which confronts him as a 
determiner. All learning is creative because the learner is the creator 
of further learning. In his role as creator, the learner makes a multi-
“I \
tude of decisions and must subsequently accept the inherent responsibil­
ity for the choices made and their implications. Goethe was fully aware 
that in actualizing its choices through application of their meanings, 
the self becomes an active agent in the process of learning.
6. In order to actively participate in the educational process, 
the learner must understand the social nature of man. A relationship of 
mutuality, based on dialogue and intercommunication, is a learning 
process. This process of learning is the application of knowledge in 
quest of meaning in a social context. The self is affected by the 
creative activity of other selves. Experience shared between two 
selves, as Goetne realized, means that the learner can determine his 
own nature and yet be an integral part of the growth and experience
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of other selves. These relationships with other selves are actually 
learning processes.
Pivotal to Goethe's epistemology was his ax<rareness that the 
relationships he participated in with others were totally dependent 
on the nature of the relationship he had with himself. The focal 
point, said Goethe, is man and how he comes to know himself through 
the relationships he establishes in life. As a true humanistic edu­
cator and philosopher, Goethe asked man to recognize and understand 
himself in order that he might be able to assume, the responsibilities 
of self-examination and self-determination.
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